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ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY ADVERTISING:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT LEGACY OF
CENTRAL HUDSON
Contrary to past practice,I state public service commissions2 now re-
strict advertising3 by electric and gas public utilities.4 Motivated pri-
1. Advertising by energy-producing public utilities was originally encouraged on the belief
that due to the efficiency of economies of scale characteristic of public utilities, costs would de-
crease as sales increased. See, e.g., West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63
(1935); Dyer v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1960); Union Elec. Co., 29
PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 3d 254 (Mo. P.S.C. 1959); Promotional Activities By Gas & Elec. Corps.,
68 PuB. Urut. REP. (PUR) 3d 162 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1967).
For a more complete discussion of the economic theory of public utilities, see notes 20-30 infra
and accompanying text.
2. "Public service commission" may be defined as a legislatively or constitutionally created
body charged with the responsibility of regulating costs and profits of public utilities in securing
the benefits while avoiding the abuses of natural monopolies. See A. FINDER, THE STATES AND
ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 16-17 (1977). For a more detailed discussion of public service
commissions, see notes 31-52 infra and accompanying text.
3. Advertising may be defined as "the commercial use,... of any media, including news-
paper, printed matter, radio, and television, in order to transmit a message to a substantial number
of members of the public or to such utility's ... customers. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2625(h)(1) (Supp. HI 1979) [hereinafter referred to as PURPA]. For a
discussion of the purpose and applicability of PURPA, see notes 86-88 infra. For purposes of
clarity and evaluation, this Note will divide "advertising" into four categories: informational,
imtitutional, political, and promotional. For a sample of alternate divisions of advertising catego-
ries, see Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 4th 268, 273-74 (Fla.
P.S.C. 1975) (promotional rates, promotional practices, information, community affairs, institu-
tional); Note, Public Utilities.- The Allowance of Advertising Expenditures for Rate-Making Pur-
poses-Is This Trip Realy Necessary, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 202, 203 n.5 (1976) (promotional,
institutional, consumer); Pun. UTIL. FORT. Mar. 1, 1973, at 47-48 (consumer, conservation, institu-
tional, promotional).
Due to the similarity of content of information, safety, consumer, and conservation advertising,
this Note will combine all four into a broad category under the label "informational" See Re
Consumers Power Co., No. U-5979 (Mich. P.S.C. Aug. 8, 1980) (allowable informational advertis-
ing includes safety, conservation, consumer rate explanation, and factual programs). Accord, Pro-
motional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. U~ni REP. (PUR) 4th 268, 275 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975)
(informational the same as consumer). For a more complete discussion of the four categories of
advertising analyzed in this Note, see notes 82-88 infra and accompanying text.
4. "Public utility" is defined as a company operating in such a way as to be "affected with a
public interest." See E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 12-37 (1950); F. WELCH,
CASES AND TEXr ON PUBLIC UTInTY REGULATION 1 (1968). See generally 1. BARNES, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1942); Munkirs, Ayers & Grandys, Rape of the Rate-
Payer Monopal Overcharges in the tegulated' Electric-Utility Industry, 8 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REV. 57, 57-58 (1976). The term "public utility" is somewhat of a misnomer in that it
-refers only to the nature of the business, not to its ownership or operation .... ." F. WELCH,
supra. Professor Welch divided public utilities into three main classes of businesses: public trans-
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manly by conservationist,5 environmental,6 and economic7 concerns,
portation services for hire, communication for hire, and entities that provide service within the
home or place of business. See F. WELCH, supra, at 2. He further defined the latter category to
include natural gas, manufactured gas, and electric light and power utilities. Id. Courts have
recognized the following factors as indicia of whether a business entity is a public utility:
(1) Whether the business devotes property to a public use. (2) Whether the business has
been regulated in the past. (3) Whether a franchise is necessary to enter the business.
(4) Whether the service rendered is a necessity to the users. (5) Whether the business has
the characteristics which create monopoly. . . . (6) Whether excessive competition will
exist without public control.
A. LEESTON, J. CRICHTON & J. JACOBS, THE DYNAMIC NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 260-61 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as J. JACOBS].
This Note will focus only on the gas and electric energy producing "public utilities." Due to the
differences in advertising policies and the distinctive operating nature of gas and electric utilities,
telephone, water, and trucking public utilities will not be considered. Accord, Pun. UTIL. FORT.,
Nov. 8, 1979, at 51, 53-54; Note, supra note 3, at 203 n.4. It is interesting to note, however, that
telephone utility advertising is experiencing similar restrictive policies. See, e.g., Re Rule Making
Relating to Advertising Expenditures, 39 PUB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 4th 296 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n
1980). Because this Note will deal only with gas and electric utilities, "utility" means both gas and
electric public utilities unless specified otherwise. For further discussion on public utilities, see
notes 19-36 infra and accompanying text.
Natural gas is a primary fuel source that can be utilized directly for energy consumption. See
SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND POWER OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 96TH
CONG., 2D SEss., THE ENERGY FAcraOOK 462 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as THE
ENERGY FACTOOK]. Electricity, by contrast, is a secondary energy source generated from pri-
mary sources such as coal, petroleum (including fuel, oil, crude oil, kerosene and petrol coke), and
natural gas and from nuclear and hydro-power sources. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK 110
(1977); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR THE CONTIGUOUS
UNITED STATES, 1980-1989, at 1.4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY]. See
generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION QUARTERLY REPORT (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as QUARTERLY REPORT]. Both electric and gas utilities operate under the theoretical
construct of economies of scale. See generally R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, ECONOMIC
REGULATION 448 (1980). In recent years, however, the economies of new plants shifted away
from electric utilities because of inflationary effects on fuel and construction costs. See THE EN-
ERGY SOURCE BOOK, .upra, at 92; R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON, & P. MARTIN, supra, at 739; notes 104-
06 infra and accompanying text. The economies of scale for gas utilities remain largely intact.
5. See Alabama Power Co., 97 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 3d 371 (Ala. P.S.C. 1972); Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 100 PuB. UTmI. REP. (PUR) 3d 257 (Cal. P.U.C. 1973); Public Serv. Co., 13 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 40 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975); Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL.
REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102
(1975); Michigan Power Co., 18 PUB. UTn. REP. (PUR) 4th 418 (Mich. P.S.C. 1977); Southern
Union Gas Co., 12 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 219 (N.M.P.S.C. 1975); Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp., 14 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 475-(N.Y.P.S.C. 1976); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 PUB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 393 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1973); Wisconsin Fuel & Light Co., 4 PUB.
UTn. REP. (PUR) 4th 368 (Wis. P.S.C. 1973). See also cases cited in note 107 infra.
Concern over conservation was precipitated largely by the 1973 Arab oil embargo. See, e.g.,
Notice of Proposal to Issue Order Restricting Certain Uses of Electric Energy, 13 N.Y. PSC 2074-
76 (Dec. 5, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Proposal]. The New York Public Service Com-
mission, assessing what appeared to be a grim energy forecast, stated that "the demands for elec-
tric energy in this state cannot be met for the foreseeable future ... ." Id. at 2072. Accord,
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state commissions are implementing these restrictions either by direct
prohibition8 or by refusal to allocate advertising costs to operating ex-
penses.9 Although utilities have responded to these restrictions with
various defenses, ° one defense in particular has fostered constitutional
Duffy, Public Relations andAdvertiing Expenses, PUB. UTII. FORT., Mar. 31, 1977, at 6,8 ("[u]ntil
the energy crises, most regulatory commissions had no difficulty in recognizing the propriety of
any reasonable advertising program as a proper business expense for a public utility"); Netschert,
Then and Now with Utility Advertising and Marketing, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 9, 1978, at 17, 17
(*'[blefore the oil embargo, utility advertising was directed at one main objective-load growth").
Only marginally responsive to conservation efforts, consumption of produced energy continues
at increased levels. For example, total electricity annual per capita consumption increased be-
tween 1960 and 1976 from 4100 kilowatt hours to 9200 kilowatt hours. FED. ENERGY ADMINIS-
TRATION, ENERGY IN Focus: BASIC DATA, at VII-1 (1977). Total electricity sales to residential,
commercial, and industrial customers increased between 1960 and 1980 from 689 billion kilowatt-
hours to 2,094 billion kilowatt-hours. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1980 VOLUME Two: DATA 161 (1980). Similar pat-
terns exist for consumption of natural gas. Total consumption by residential, commercial, indus-
trial, transportation, and electrical utilities grew between 1960 and 1979 from 11.97 trillion to
20.02 trillion cubic feet of gas. Id. at 107.
6. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 3d 270 (Cal. P.U.C. 1971); Public
Serv. Co., 13 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 40 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975); Promotional Practices of Elec.
Utils., 8 PUB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla. P.U.C. 1975); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii
260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975). Accord, Duffy, supra note 5, at 8 (current concern over advertising due
to environmental considerations). See generally Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concerm
Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974);
cases cited note 108 infra.
7. Economic concerns include growth needs, inflation, and benefits to consumer. See Pro-
motional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 Pun. UT. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975); Michigan
Consol. Gas Co., 1 PUB. Urtt. REP. (PUR) 4th 229 (Mich. P.S.C. 1973); Detroit Edison Co., 3
PUB. Urn.. REP. (PUR) 4th 209 (Mich. P.S.C. 1974); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 PuB. UTIL. REP.
(PUR) 4th 393 (Or. P.U.C. 1974). Accord, Duffy, supra note 5, at 8 (current concern over advertis-
ing due in part to inflation considerations). See generally Joskow, supra note 6; cases cited note
109 infra.
8. See, eg., Notice of Proposal, supra note 5, at 2074-76. For a partial reproduction of the
New York direct prohibition, see note 145 infra.
9. For purposes of this Note, cost allocation consists of the process by which a utility ex-
pease is passed on to the consumer in the form of rate charges. For a complete discussion of the
cost allocation issue, see notes 65-81 & 196-276 infra and accompanying text.
10. Utilities traditionally defend advertising expenditures under one of two theories: four-
teenth amendment due process claim for undue confiscation of property or assault on manage-
ment prerogative. The cases supporting the due process defense include Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Bluefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. West Virginia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). Those
cases supporting the management prerogative defense include Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 359 So.2d 776 (Ala. 1978); State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887
(Okla. 1975). See Note, Advertising by Public Utilities as an Allowable Expense for Jatemaking:
Assault on Management Prerogative, 13 VAL. U.L. REv. 87 (1978). See generally P. GARFIELD &
W. LovEJoY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS (1964).
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debate. By asserting that restrictions on advertising" operate as a de-
nial of first amendment' 2 free speech rights, utilities bring into conflict
substantial national concerns: the notion of constitutionally protected
free speech versus the nationwide concern over energy conservation,
environmental control, and inflation. 3
The resolution of this conflict is tied directly to the recent United
States Supreme Court commercial speech decision in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission." Commercial
speech,' 5 which includes utility advertising,' 6 is not accorded full first
amendment protection. 7 In reaffirming that some first amendment
protection exists for commercial speech, the Court in Central Hudson
established a four-part test. 8 This test is the current standard by which
courts must analyze public service commission advertising restrictions.
This Note assesses the impact of the Central Hudson test on electric
and gas utility advertising and explores the tension between free speech
11. Utilities argue that by a direct prohibition on advertising they are prevented from engag-
ing in that speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Ser. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
560 (1980). When advertising costs are not allowed in ratemaking, utilities argue that in order to
speak they must purchase advertising with constitutionally protected shareholder profits. See La-
clede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dis-
missed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sere. Conm'n, 64 A.D.2d
345, 410 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1978), aftd, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 413 N.E.2d 359, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981).
12. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech.... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The first amendment is applica-
ble to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975).
13. See notes 107-09 & 208-10 infra and accompanying text. Another issue raised by this
current regulatory trend is whether the "reasonableness" standard for advertising expenses and
deference to management prerogative established in West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935), is still valid. See notes 91-109 & 273-76 infra and accompanying
text.
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
15. Commercial speech is defined as "speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 n.24 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973). The Court in Central Hudson defined commercial speech slightly differently by
stating that it was "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Sere. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). For a
discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see notes 110-55 infra and accompanying text.
16. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Ser. Comm'n, 600
S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dgmissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981).
17. For a discussion of the first amendment status of commercial speech, see notes 124-51
i.fra and accompanying text.
18. See note 147 infra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/8
PUBLIC UTILITY ADVERTISING
rights and energy, environmental, and economic considerations. Part I
examines the economic theory of public utility regulation and ratemak-
ing. Part II traces the doctrinal underpinnings of the commercial
speech defense from its inception to its apparent culmination in the
Central Hudson test. Part III then analyzes the degree to which a com-
mercial speech defense protects utility advertising. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the question left unresolved by Central Hudson: whether rea-
sonableness of the amount of expenditures remains a valid means by
which to evaluate utility advertising.
I. REGULATORY ECONOMICS
A. Natural Monopolies
The rationale for regulating public utilities is based on the economic
concept of natural monopoly. A natural monopoly exists when a "rele-
vant market' 9 has an "indispensable economic need"'2 for a product
and one firm, rather than two or more, can satisfy that need at the
lowest possible cost.2' Public utilities are the most common examples
of natural monopolies. 22
Economic theory indicates that public utilities will operate most effi-
ciently and produce lower unit costs under a monopoly format.3 Con-
struction of generating and transmission facilities requires large capital
expenditures.24 A protected monopoly is able to make the most effi-
cient use of these capital expenditures for two reasons: monopoly pro-
tection "eliminates costly duplication" of generating and transmission
19. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969).
20. Munkirs, Ayers & Grandys, supra note 4, at 57.
21. Posner, supra note 19, at 548. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMXCS OF REGULATION: PRUN-
CIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 119 (1970). Kahn defines "natural monopoly" as one in which there "is
an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire extent of the market. This is so only
when the economies achievable by a larger output are internal to the individual firm ..... Id.
See generally A. ALCHiAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION, THEORY IN USE 427
(19 69).
22. See Posner, supra note 19, at 548 ("[t]his set of controls has been applied mainly to gas,
water, and electric power companies").
23. See Gabel, Swartz & Zeitlin, Utility Rates, Consumers, and the New York State Public
Service Commission, 39 ALB. L. REv. 707, 709 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gabel].
24. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 3; P. GARFIELD & W. Low oy, supra note 10, at 17;
Gabel, supra note 23, at 709; Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry. The Impact of
Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 64, 82 (1972). These initial capital expenditures required to
construct generating and transmission facilities may also be referred to as fixed costs. Fixed costs
are defined as those costs that remain constant regardless of output. Fixed costs may also be
referred to as "overhead charges." P. SAMUEsON, ECONOMICS 464-65 (1973).
Number 2]
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facilities,25 and, more importantly, when these fixed costs are averaged
on a per unit of production basis, average unit costs decrease as output
increases.26 Hence, public utilities are subject to the principle of "econ-
omies of scale," which means that the cost of each unit becomes
cheaper as the .utility produces more units.27 Consumers' costs for a
utility's services potentially are the lowest when only one firm produces
that service within the relevant market. Left unchecked in this compet-
itive void, however, a profit-maximizing2" public utility is free to ex-
ploit its market position by charging exorbitant prices.29 To curb this
otherwise uncontrolled power and its potential for pricing abuse, state
legislatures created public service commissions.3
25. Gabel, supra note 23, at 709.
26. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 3; P. GARFIELD & W. LovEJoy, supra note 10, at 18; 1 A.
KAHN, supra note 21, at 45-46.
27. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 21, at 11. Due to economic and social changes, the principle
of economies of scale is of less significance today, especially as to electric utilities. See notes 99-
100 infra and accompanying text.
28. See Munkirs, supra note 4, at 58.
29. See A. ALcmAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 21, at 427; 1 A. KAHN, supra note 26, at 27-28.
30. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 16-17. In theory, the development of the public service
commissions was designed to stimulate the forces of competition that occur in a competitive mar-
ket. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 26, at 17; 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
1-2 (1969). Thus, the regulatory commission acts as a surrogate competitor. Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976).
The historical development of public service commissions began with the common-law state
police power under which was created the "power of the state to do things to protect and promote
the health and welfare of its citizens." F. WELCH, supra note 4, at 3. This limited basis for regula-
tion gained additional support in the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113 (1877). See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 16; F. WELCH, supra note 4, at 1. In Munn the
Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Illinois legislature to regulate rate ceiling for those
businesses "affected with a public interest.' 94 U.S. at 126.
Nevertheless, the state legislative authority to regulate businesses "affected with the public in-
terest" was circumscribed to purely intrastate transactions in a subsequent opinion. See Wabash,
St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). This decision confirmed the authority of the
federal government to regulate interstate commerce. As a result of Wabash, state legislatures were
powerless to regulate organizations engaging in interstate commerce. This void was filled by the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1877. Creation of the ICC was impor-
tant for two reasons: it made possible the regulation of public utilities not solely engaged in
intrastate activity, and the structure and organization of the ICC served as a model for the im-
pending state regulatory commissions. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 16.
In response to these developments, the Georgia, New York, and Wisconsin legislatures in 1907
established the first state public service commissions. Id. Even though their regulation was lim-
ited to intrastate activity, the subsequent creation of the Federal Power Commission and its corre-
sponding regulations "limited the development of electric and gas utilities to statewide systems,"
effectively giving control of public utilities to the states. Id. at 17.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/8
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B. Public Service Commissions
Public service commissions 31 of one form or another exist in all fifty
states and the District of Columbia.32 Creation of these regulatory
bodies is either by state legislative33 or constitutional34 authority.
Commission size varies from one commissioner3' to seven, 6 with most
states having between three to five commission members.37 Members'
terms of office, which are often staggered, 8 range from four9 to eight
years,' with selection varying from gubernatorial appointment4 1 to
statewide election.42 To neutralize the politics of the decision making
process of public service commissions, some states regulate the political
composition of the membership.43 In all but nine states, service on the
31. The term "public service commission" for purposes of this Note will be used synony-
mously with "regulatory commission" and "commission."
32. For purposes of clarity and continuity, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, though terri-
tories of the United States, are omitted from consideration in this Note. Puerto Rico, however,
does have a three-member public service commission with members serving four-year terms. Se-
lection is by gubernatorial appointment with senatorial approval. Members serve on a full-time
basis. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 18.
The Virgin Islands has a nine-member commission appointed by the governor to serve three-
year staggered terms. See id.
33. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 37-1-1 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.01 (West 1968); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 269-2 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 1 (1973); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 25, § 1
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); Mo. REv. STAT. § 386.040 (1978); N.L STAT. ANN. § 48:2-1 (West
Supp. 1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4901.02 (Page Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-1-1
(1974).
34. See, ag., CAL. CONsT. art. XII, § 22; GA. CoNsT. § 2-2703; VA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
35. See OR. REV. STAT. § 756.020 (1974) (single commissioner).
36. See S.C. CODE § 58-3-10 (1976) (seven commissioners).
37. Those commissions having three members include: VA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1; ALA. CODE
§ 1 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.01 (West 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4901.02 (Page Supp.
1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-1-I (1974).
38. See, eg., CAL. CONsT. art. XII, § 22; AA. CODE § 37-1-3 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-
1-1.5 (1974); VA. CODE § 12.1-6 (1973).
39. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 37-1-3 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.01 (West 1968); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 26-34 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 756.020 (1974).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-10(b),(c) (Curn. Supp. 1981). Other states fall somewhere be-
tween the two extremes. CAL. CONsT. art. XII, § 22 (six years); ILL, REv. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 1
(1973) (five years); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 25, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980) (coterminous with
governor); OR. REV. STAT. § 756.020 (1974). Of the above states, all but Oregon require senate
advice or approval of the governor's selection. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 18.
41. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 18.
42. See, ag., GA. CONST. § 2-2703; N.D. CoNsT. art. V, § 12; ALA. CODE § 37-1-3 (1975);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.01 (West 1968).
43. See, eg., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, § 1 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 25, § 2
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); OHIO REv. CODE § 4901.02 (Page Supp. 1980).
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commission is a full-time position.44 The fundamental task of the pub-
lic service commissions is to secure the benefits of a natural monopoly
while preventing the inherent abuses. 45
Public service commissions regulate utility advertising primarily
through ratemaking.4 Ratemaking is the process in which regulatory
commissions strive to simulate the effects of a competitive market by
controlling profits.47 Waste is an inevitable consequence of artificial
profit control.48 Because utilities are guaranteed a profit,49 they have
little incentive to minimize costs.5 0 This likelihood of wasteful spend-
ing compels regulatory commissions to control utility expenses as well
as profits. Because utilities include some advertising expenses in their
cost accounts,51 commissions must accordingly eliminate wasteful ad-
44. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 18. The nine states not having full-time commission
members are Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id. Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Vermont, however, do have
full-time commission chairpersons. Id.
45. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 17.
46. For a complete discussion of the theory and process of ratemaking, see J. BONBRIGHT,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 147-283 (1966); 1 A. KAHN, supra note 26, at 20-57; 1 A.
PRIEST, supra note 30, at 45-226. See also notes 56-115 infra and accompanying text.
Regulation of utility advertising may be' achieved by public service commission policy state-
ments. See notes 163-95 infra and accompanying text.
Ratemaking is distinguishable from rate regulation despite their similarities. Rate regulation is
a broad term that may include the specific act of ratemaking. Generally, rate regulation and
ratemaking differ in timing. Ratemaking is initiated when a utility files for a rate increase. See,
ag., CAL. PUB. UTL. CODE §§ 486, 495 (Deering 1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 269-16 (1976);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 159, § 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-3-2(2) (1973).
Once this rate schedule is on file, it is subject to challenge either by regulatory commissions or by
independent sources. See, e.g., CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE § 455 (Deering 1970); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4909.27 (Page Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 756.500, .515 (1979). Once challenged, the
rates are subject to alteration by the commission should the charges be deemed unreasonable. See,
eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 364.14, 366.07 (West 1968); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 164, § 94
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-2 (1974).
47. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 26, at 17.
48. See Posner, supra note 19, at 601-02. According to Posner, "[r]egulation may encourage
other wasteful expenditures. Management can react in two ways to a ceiling on profits. It can
charge the price that will return the allowed profit and not more. Or it can charge the monopoly
price but convert the forbidden profit into increased cost." Id.
49. Under the rule in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), a utility is granted a "fair return
upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience." Id. at 547. See notes 54-63
infra and accompanying text.
50. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 21, at 428.
51. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 46-47; W. JONES, CASES AND TEXT ON REGULATED
INDUSTRIES 183-84 (1967); 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 45-46, 191-93; Jones, An Example ofa
Regulatory Alternative to Anitrust: New York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM. L. REv.
462, 480 (1973).
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Smyth v. Ames5" governs the process of establishing rates. Smyth
guarantees the utility a "fair return on the fair value" of its product.: 4
The Smyth Court, however, left open the precise meaning of "fair
value" and "fair return."" After years of shifting doctrine, 56 the
Supreme Court settled these ambiguities in Bluefield Water Works &
Improvement Co. v. West Virginia Public Service Commission 7 and
FederalPower Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 58 Emphasizing the
"end result"'59 of rate setting, the Hope Court declared that the legal
standard for "fair value" is the dollar value of the depreciated original
52. See Jones, supra note 51, at 477. Professor Jones, in discussing wasteful expenditures,
noted that "such high rates and profits generally should be disallowed to prevent monopolistic
exploitation of consumers. ... Id.
53. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
54. Id. at 547. The Court noted that in order for a utility "to earn a fair return on the value"
of its investment, reasonable rates must be set. Id. The opinion in Smyth was a precursor of the
subsequent comparable earnings test stated in Bluefield Water Works Co. v. West Virginia Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), and Federal Power Corm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944). See generally 1 A. PRtr.sT, supra note 30, at 191-94; Jones, supra note 51.
55. The Court refused to choose between one of three methods of evaluation of the "fair
value" standard: original cost, market value of stocks and bonds, and present cost of construction.
See J. JACOBS, supra note 4, at 268.
56. See id. In the 46-year interim between Smyth and Hope, the Court went from a focus on
reproduction costs to the creation of the "prudent investment" theory in a dissenting opinion in
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Cornm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 306-07 (1923) (Brandeis and
Holmes, JJ., dissenting). In 1933 the Court reaffirmed the reproduction costs approach in Los
Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. California R-R. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 307-08 (1933).
57. 262 U.S. 679 (1923). The Supreme Court, in giving meaning to "rate of return," estab-
lished a specific standard expressing a policy ensuring a utility's guaranteed profit and an ability
to attract capital
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of
the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally
being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments
in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertain-
ties; but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in
highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be
adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its
credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public
duties .. "
Id. at 692-93.
58. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
59. Id. at 603.
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investment °.6  The Court further clarified that the "fair return" aspect
of the Smyth decision requires a level of return sufficient to pay interest
on debt and dividends on preferred stock and to maintain the firm's
financial integrity.61
Accordingly, under the Smyth-Bluoqeld-Hope analyses, the primary
objective in ratemaking is to set rates so that the utility will be able to
meet its legitimate operating expenses as well as to pay creditors and
provide dividends to shareholders.62 The utility's return should be suf-
ficient to maintain its financial integrity so that it might attract new
capital.63 Most state regulatory commissions use this judicially devel-
oped approachf'
The most frequent implementation 65 of the objectives established in
the Smyth-Bluofeld-Hope trilogy occurs when a utility files a new rate
schedule.66 After the utility files a rate request, the commission evalu-
ates the requested rates, usually at a hearing. 67 The figures discussed in
the ratemaking process are based on "test year" results-actual
detailed financial information from a previously recorded year of oper-
ation.68  The test year figures that have commission approval are then
60. Id. at 603-05. See 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 142-56; Jacobs, SUpra note 4, at 268.
"Original cost," now a term of art, has been defined as the "cost of an asset when first devoted to
public service." J. BONBRIOHT, supra note 46, at 174 n.2. Most jurisdictions follow the "original
cost" approach, although a decided minority still uses a "fair value" formula based on actual cost.
Id. at 158-71.
61. 320 U.S. at 603. The Hope Court noted: "[lit is important that there be enough revenue
not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business.... That return,
moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as
to maintain its credit and to attract capital... ..." Id. See 1 A. P R ST, supra note 30, at 191-92;
Jones, supra note 51, at 477. The "fair return" aspect of Smyth and Hope was developed by the
Supreme Court in BlueFeld. See note 57 supra.
62. 320 U.S. at 603; 262 U.S. at 692-93; 169 U.S. at 544. See Jones, JudIcial.Determination of
Public Utility Rates.- 4 Critique, 54 B.U.L. Rnv. 873, 875 (1974).
63. 320 U.S. at 603, 605; 262 U.S. at 693. See Jones, supra note 51, at 477.
64. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 25.
65. Most rate issues arise during the actual process of ratemaking. Nevertheless, complaints
may be filed about existing rates either upon initiative of an independent source or motion of a
regulatory commission. See note 46 supra.
66. See, eg., N.Y. PuB. Smwv. LAw § 66(12) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
67. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 23; J. JACOBS, supra note 4, at 267; Gabel, supra note 23,
at 718.
68. See J. BoNBRIoHT, supra note 46, at 150 n.7; 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 45; Jones,
supra note 51, at 477. The test year is frequently the 12 months immediately preceeding rate
determination. See I A. PRIEsT, supra note 30, at 45. However, the year most often selected is the
most recent one for which complete data is available. See Gabel, supra note 23, at 720 (the year
for which total data is determinable); Huntington, The .Rapid Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing
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injected into the traditional ratemaking formula refined from principles
set out in the Smith-Bluefield-Hope trilogy: (rate base X rate-of-return)
+ operating expenses = revenue.69 The revenue component represents
the total dollar amount a utility may legally receive from the retail rates
it charges consumers. 70 The rate base is the formula that expresses the
Smyth "fair value" requirement.71 In most jurisdictions,72 the rate base
is the sum of the utility's original investment and the working capital
in the Regulation ofElectric Utility Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L. REv. 689, 699 (1975) (selection of
test year for which detailed financial information on company's operations is available); Jones,
supra note 62, at 876 (most recent annual period for which complete financial data is available);
Posner, supra note 19, at 592 (ordinarily the most recent typical year of operation for which com-
plete data are available).
In West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79 (1935), Justice Cardozo emphati-
cally rejected the notion of basing ratemaking on a single test year: "[A]doption of a single year as
an exclusive test or standard imposed upon the company [is] an arbitrary restriction in contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the 'rudiments of fair play' made necessary thereby."
Id at 81. Furthermore, the "test year" need not be wholly "historical." See 1 A. PRIEST, supra
note 30, at 45; Gabel, supra note 23, at 720. Some have called for a future or projected test year.
See Note, The Use of the Future Test Year in Utility Rate-Making, 52 B.U.L. Rnv. 791 (1972). The
more common solution, however, is to use a test year based partly on historical experience and
partly on projected figures. See 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 45; Gabel, supra note 23, at 720;
Jones, supra note 62, at 880.
Due to inflation and other factors, the test year figures may not accurately represent normal
conditions. As a result, adjustments must be made in the data. See Huntington, supra, at 699
(citing rate increases, wage increases, tax consequences, and environmental compliance costs as
factors requiring adjustments in test year data); Jones, supra note 62, at 877 (citing abnormal
conditions such as labor disturbances, unusual weather, or atypical equipment outages as factors).
See generally 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 45. For a criticism of test year data use, see Posner,
supra note 19, at 593-94.
69. Pontz & Sheller, The Consumer Interest-Is it Being Protected by the Public Utility Com-
mission?, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 315 (1972). The same components have been expressed in slightly vary-
ing formulas by other sources. See also J. JAcoBs, supra note 4, at 267. Jacobs expressed the
formula in the following format: R - E + (v) r + d + T, when R = revenue to be received from
the rates in question; E = annual operating expense; v = value of the physical property; r = rate of
return, expressed as a fraction; d - current annual depreciation; and T = taxes. Id at 267.
70. See J. JACOBS, supra note 4, at 267; Pontz & Sheller, supra note 69, at 316. The amount
of revenue represented by R does not represent a guaranteed amount, but rather the amount a
utility has an opportunity to earn. 1 A. PRIEsT, supra note 30, at 46, 191.
71. See Gabel, supra note 23, at 720.
72. See note 60supra and accompanying text. Professor Bonbright defined "original cost" as
the "cost of an asset when first devoted to public service rather than cost to a transferee company."
J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 46, at 174 n.2. Currently thirty-six state commissions employ the "origi-
nal cost" method. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 38. A decided minority of 13 state commis-
sions abides by the "fair value" rate base method. Id at 39. Fair value jurisdictions compute rate
base on utility property "used and useful." 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 46. Hence, fair value
jurisdictions consider more than just "original cost" in computing rate base figures. See Missouri
Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 308 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1957). Accord Joplin Water Works Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 495 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1973).
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allowance73 less accumulated depreciation.74
When determining a utility's rate-of-return, a commission must sat-
isfy the Hope and Bluefeld policy requirements of maintaining and
supporting credit and attracting capital investment.75 Commissions
usually determine rate-of-return by the "cost of capital" approach. 76
Under this method, a commission inspects the capital structure of a
utility to determine cost of debt, preferred stock, and common stock.77
By making the appropriate calculations,78 the commission may then
determine the appropriate rate-of-return.
The final element of the ratemaking formula is operating expenses, 79
which include such costs as labor, maintenance, materials, supplies,80
and advertising.81
2. Advertising
Public utilities employ four general types82 of advertising: informa-
tional, institutional, political, and promotional. Informational adver-
73. See F. WELCH, PRE.PARING FOR THE UILrry RATE CASE 160-61 (1954). Working capi-
tal represents the amount of cash needed to satisfy day-to-day expenses in the normal operations
of the utility. See P. GARFiELD & W. Lownjoy, supra note 10, at 71; F. WELCH, Supra, at 195. For
example, if for an appropriate test year the original cost of plant investment were $50 million and
accrued depreciation on that investment were $5 million and an allowance was granted of $3
million for working capital, the rate base for the utility would be $48 million. This amount of rate
base is then multiplied by the appropriate rate-of-return percentage. Technically, rate of return is
represented as a percentage of the rate base. See. I A. PRiEsT, supra note 30, at 46; F. WELCH,
supra note 73, at 201.
74. For a discussion rate base determination, see J. BONBERIGIT, supra note 46, at 172-91; 1
A. KAHN, supra note 26, at 35-41.
75. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
76. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 46, at 240.56; 1 A. PRIEST, .upra note 30, at 208-10; Jones,
supra note 62, at 881.
77. See Jones, supra note 62, at 881.
78. This computation is best explained by Professor Jones' example: If the utility had a capi-
tal structure consisting of 50% debt, 15% preferred stock, and 35% common stock and the commis-
sion determined the cost of debt to be 6%, the cost of preferred stock to be 8%, and the cost of
common stock 12%, then the composite cost of capital can be calculated.
Debt 50% at 6% = .030
Preferred Stock 15% at 8% - .012
Common Stock 35% at 12% - .042
The composite cost of capital is .084 or 8.4%. Id at 881.
79. See Gabel, supra note 23, at 723.
80. Id
81. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. An expense included in the rate formula may
also be referred to as "above-the-line."
82. See note 3 supra.
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tising is designed to inform consumers about everyday services, safety
precautions, conservation measures, and rate changes.83 Institutional
advertising, also known as goodwill advertising because of its goal of
fostering goodwill toward the public utility,84 is "designed to enhance
or preserve the corporate image of the utility. '85 Political advertising86
includes "advertising for the purpose of influencing public opinion
with respect to legislative, administrative, or electoral matters, or with
respect to any controversial issue of public importance. '8 7  Finally,
83. See PUB. UTiL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1973, at 47; Note, supra note 10, at 118. The New York
Public Service Commission has included "time-of-day" advertising in its definition of informa-
tional advertising: "We recognize, however, that as we move toward more and more widespread
adoption of time of day rates, it may be highly desirable for companies to publicize those
rates .... [Tihis advertising may better be described as informational. . . ." Notice of Propo-
sal supra note 5, at 2-R, 3-R Informational advertising may also be referred to as "consumer,"
.',afety," or "conservation" advertising. See PUB. UTiL FORT., Mar. 1, 1973, at 47; note 3 supra.
The Idaho Public Utilities Commission defines informational advertising as "advertising which
encourages safety, promotes conservation, or fosters the proper use of electrical appliances, [and]
confers actual benefits upon ratepayers. . . ." Re Idaho Power Co., 29 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR)
4th 183, 204 (Idaho P.U.C. 1979). Accord, Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 PUB. UTiL. REP.
(PUR) 4th 153 (Ark. P.S.C. 1976); Re Consumers Power Co., No. U-5979 (Mich. P.S.C. Aug. 8,
1980); Southern Union Gas Co., 12 PuB. UTE. REp. (PUR) 4TH 219 (N.M.P.S.C. 1975).
84. See Re Public Serv. Co., No. 2548 (N.H.P.S.C. July 31, 1980) (institutional advertising
promotes goodwill of utility); Brief for Appellant at 18, Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dirmissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981) (institutional advertis-
ing referred to as "goodwill advertising"); Note, supra note 10, at 117.
85. See PUB. Urm. FORT., Mar. 1, 1973, at 47. Accord, Re Washington Gas Light Co., 39
PuB. UTiL. REP. (FUR) 4th 161 (D.C.P.S.C. 1980); Re Tampa Elec. Co., 39 PuB. Urn.. REp.
(PUR) 4th 553 (Fla. P.S.C. 1980); Re Promotional Practices of Pub. Util. & Coop. Util. Ass'ns, 97
PUB. UTIL. REP. (FUR) 3d I (Okla. Corp. Comm'n 1972). Institutional or goodwill advertising
focuses on aspects other than selling a product. G. FLANIGAN, MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ADVER-
TISING 3-4 (1967).
86. One writer classified advertising of a political nature under the broad heading of institu-
tional advertising. Ciscel, Tempest in a Teapot: Utility Advertising, Pun. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 12,
1976, at 35, 37. Nevertheless, the recent judicial focus on utility advertising of a political nature
and Congress' separate treatment of political advertising in Titles I and III of PURPA seems to
warrant the decision to treat political advertising as a separate category. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 3203(b)(1)(B) (Supp. I1 1979); 16 U.S.C. § 2625(h)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979). Accord, First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Re Washington Gas Light Co., 39 PuB. UTIL. REP.
(PUR) 4th 161 (D.C.P.S.C. 1980); Re Rule Making Relating to Advertising Expenditures, 39 PuB.
UrIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 295 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1980); Re The Narragansett Elec. Co., 23 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (FUR) 4th 509 (R.I.P.U.C. 1978). Political advertising may also be referred to as
controversial issue advertising. See Re Rule Making Relating to Advertising Expenditures, 39
PUB. UTU.. REP. (FUR) 4th 295 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1980).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 3203(b)(I)(B) (Supp. III 1979); 16 U.S.C. 2625(h)(1)(B) (Supp. m1 1979).
Even though PURPA does not expressly preempt state authority to conduct ratemaking, it never-
theless serves as an influential federal factor in state rate proceedings. See Note, Title I of
PURP4: The Effect of Federal Intrusion into Regulation of Public Utilities, 21 WM. & MARY L.
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public utilities engage in promotional advertising, which encourages
the use of a utility's services or the use of appliances or equipment
designed to use the utility's services.88
In order to prevent a utility from exploiting its monopoly position,8 9
the operating expense element of the ratemaking formula can include
only those advertising expenses that are reasonable.90 The Supreme
Court developed the reasonableness standard in West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Ohio Public Utilities Commission.9 The Court held that commissions
must accord management discretion a presumption of validity92 and
REv. 491, 505-06 (1979). Submitted in 1977 as part of President Carter's national energy plan,
PURPA embodies a proposal to reform retail electric and gas rate design by providing federally
uniform standards for public utilities. See Wagner, Multiple ReferraL" House Energy B1i, 35
CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 841 (1977).
PURPA requires state regulatory agencies to assess whether the federal standards would further
the Act's purpose if implemented by the state. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (Supp. 1111979). If the Aces
standards conflict with existing state law, a state is not required to adopt the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 2623
(Supp. II. 1979). See, e.g., Re Determination of Whether Advertising Rules Conform to Pub.
Util. Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, No. 35723 (Ind. P.S.C. Jan. 16, 1980) (commission noting
state policies consistent with Act's purpose); Re Consolidated Edison Co., No. 80-8 (N.Y.P.S.C.
Mar. 7, 1980) (declining adoption of PURPA due to conflict in policy on promotional advertising).
It is interesting to note that PURPA expressly proscribes promotional and political advertising
costs from being passed on in consumer rates. 16 U.S.C. § 2623(h) (Supp. 1111979). At least one
court has declared PURPA unconstitutional. See Mississippi v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 38 Pun. UTIL. RaP. (PUR) 4th 284,287-88 (S.D. Miss. 1981) (Miss. Power & Light Co.,
intervenor),prob. jur. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3930 (U.S. argued Jan. 19, 1982) (No. 80-1749). The
Mississippi federal district court indignantly declared: "The sovereign state of Mississippi is not a
robot, or lackey which may be shuttled back and forth to suit the whim and caprice of the federal
government, but was and is the prime benefactor of the power and authority designated by the
Constitution... Id at 285.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 3203(b(l)(C) (Supp. I1 1979); 16 U.S.C. § 2625(h)(I)(C) (Supp. III
1979). The New York Public Service Commission defined promotional advertising as "advertis-
ing intended to stimulate the purchase of the utility services." See Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Accord, Pun. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1973, at 47;
Note, supra note 10, at 106.
The definitions provided in Titles I and III of PURPA are not mandatorily imposed on state
commissions. Rather, the definitions provide an authoritative federal view and suggest appropri-
ate guidelines for dealing with gas and electric advertising and rates. See note 86 upra.
The PURPA definition of promotional advertising, which includes the promotion of sale and
use of energy-using appliances, accords with regulatory commission policy. See Re Tampa Elec.
Co., 39 Pun. UTIL. REp. (PUR) 4th 553 (Fla. P.S.C. 1980); Re Idaho Power Co., 29 PuB. UTIL.
REP. (PUR) 4th 183 (Idaho P.S.C. 1979); Re Rule Making Relating to Advertising Expenditures,
39 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 295 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1980).
89. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
90. For a discussion of the "reasonableness" standard, see notes 91-109 infra and accompa-
nying text.
91. 294 U.S. 63 (1935).
92. Id at 72. Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, stated:
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that regulatory commissions can disallow advertising expenses only if
those expenses are a by-product of inefficiency or improvidence.93
After West Ohio Gas, courts consistently overturned arbitrary regula-
tory commission decisions that had disallowed advertising cost alloca-
tion.94 As a result, regulatory commissions readily accepted advertising
outlays between 1935 and the early 1970s.91 During this period of lais-
sez-faire utility advertising regulation, the principle of economies of
scale operated at its zenith of efficiency.96 Growth and consumption
were desirable elements for utilities.97 Hence, advertising that stimu-
lated growth received broad approval. 98
In the early 1970s regulatory commissions abruptly changed this pol-
The commission did not question the fact of payment, but cut down the allowance...
on the ground that anything more was unnecessary and wasteful. The criticism has no
basis in evidence, either direct or circumstantial. Good faith is to be presumed on the
part of the managers of a business.
Id (citations omitted).
93. Id at 72. Justice Cardozo added: "The presumption of correctness that gives aid in
controversies of this order ... was confined in this instance by what amounts to a finding of
regularity.... A public utility will not be permitted to include negligent or wasteful losses
among its operating charges." Id at 68.
Important burdens of proof were also delineated in West Ohio Gas. Because the utility has a
monopolistic edge on the public, it traditionally has the intial burden of proof in seeking a rate
increase. El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 812, 362 S.W.2d 680 (1962). West
Ohio Gas established that this burden may be met upon a showing of an expense paid. Further-
more, the Court in West Ohio Gas stated that once the utility statisfies its burden, the burden shifts
to the commission to prove the cost "unnecessary or wasteful." 294 U.S. at 72. The standard of
proof set out in West Ohio Gas was adopted in a different form by an Idaho court in Boise Water
Corp. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 97 Idaho 832, 837, 553 P.2d 163, 171 (1976) (utility burden of
production met by a showing of actual incurrence of expense; burden shifted to commission to
show expenses unreasonable).
94. See, e.g., City of El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 812, 362 S.W.2d
680 (1962); Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 3d 300 (Cal. P.U.C. 1960); Central
Me. Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 136 A.2d 726 (1957); State exrel. Dyer
v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 975 (Mo. 1960).
95. See, ag., Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 PUB. UIL. REP. (PUR) 3d 300 (Cal. P.U.C. 1960);
Kansas City Power & Light Co., 6 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 321 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n
1974); Promotional Activities By Gas & Elec. Corps., 68 PuB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 3d 162
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1967).
96. See FEDERAL PowR COMMISSION, THE 1970 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, pt. 1, ch. 1, at
34 (1971); A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 47. For a more detailed treatment of the utility economic
growth of this period, see Note, State Regulation ofAdvertising by Investor-OwnedElectric Utilities:
The Development of Current Standards and Their Constitutional Limits, 12 IND. L. REv. 603, 607-
11 (1979). For a discussion of the principle of economies of scale, see notes 23-29 supra and
accompanying text.
97. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 47.
98. See West Ohio Gas. Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935) ("[w]ithin
the limits of reason, advertising or development expenses to foster normal growth are legitimate
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icy of promoting growth and consumption. Primarily because of re-
duced economies of scale,99 especially for electric utilities,1e the
expansion oriented policies no longer brought about reduced per unit
service costs. Cognizant of these and other developments, 10 1 most reg-
ulatory decision makers abandoned the traditional reasonableness
standard and began restricting electric and gas utility advertising on the
basis of content." 2 By directly prohibiting advertising 0 3 and disallow-
charges upon income for rate purposes as for others"); cases cited in notes 94-95 supra; Note,
supra note 96, at 609 & n.45.
99. See A. FINDER, supra note 2, at 1. In addition, a reduction in demand growth as well as
social and environmental concerns have also contributed to this change in advertising policy. See
THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 92; National Energy Act: Hearings on H.A 6831,
H.R 687, H.RA 1562, H.RA 2088, H.RA 2818, HRA 3317, HRA 3664, HRA 6660 Before the Subcomm.
on Energy and Power of the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, vol. 1, at 78-79 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as National Energy Act Hearings]; Note,
supra note 96, at 612.
100. The decline in efficiency of the economies of scale principle applies primarily to the elec-
tric utility industry. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 92; Note, supra note 96, at
611-12. Because gas and electric utilities have distinctive operating efficiencies, the principle of
economies of scale operates more economically for gas utilities today. See Brief for Appellants at
19, 66-67, Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal
dismissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981).
101. Since the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the nation and especially public service commissions
have developed an acute consciousness for energy conservation. See note 5 sur a. Closely paral-
leling the energy shortage has been the rapid acceleration of retail energy costs. See R. PImcE, G.
ALLIsON & P. MARTIn, supra note 4, at 739; THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 92;
Netschert, supra note 5, at 17. Accordingly, public service commissions have become even more
cost conscious. See Note, supra note 10, at 107 n.118.
102. See, e.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 153 (Ark. P.S.C.
1976); Los Angeles v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 7 Cal. 3d 331, 497 P.2d 785, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972);
Public Serv. Co., 13 PUB. UTL. REP. (PUR) 4th 40 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975); Tampa Elec. Co., 9 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 402 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975); In re Hawaiian Elee Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d
1102 (1975); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 10 PUB. UnL. REP. (PUR) 4th 13 (Md. P.S.C. 1975); Public
Serv. Co. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513 (1973); Utility Advertising Expenditures, 14 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 578 (Or. P.U.C. 1976); Narragansett Elec. Co., 1 PUB. UTIL. PEP. (PUR) 4th
60 (R.LP.U.C. 1973).
This trend has continued. See, eg., Re Atlanta Gas Light Co., No. 3167-U (Ga. P.S.C. Jan. 19,
1980); Re Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 PUB. UnL. RE'. (PUR) 4th 49 (. Commerce Comm'n
1980); Re Determination of Whether Advertising Rules Conform to Pub. Util. Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, No. 35723 (Ind. P.S.C. Jan. 16, 1980); Re Michigan Gas Util. Co., No. U-6022 (Mich.
P.S.C. Feb. 5, 1980); Re Advertising Practices of Tel., Elec. & Gas Distribution Cos., 35 Pun.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 361 (NJ. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1980); Re Gas Co., 35 PUB. UrIL. REP. (PUR) 4th
106 (N.M.P.S.C. 1980); Re Ohio Edison Co., 33 PUB. UTL RP. (PUR) 4th 435 (Ohio P.U.C.
1980); Re South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 34 PuB. UTIL Ra'. (PUR) 4th 458 (S.C.P.S.C. 1980);
Re Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 34 PUB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 569 (Wis. P.S.C. 1980).
103. See notes 165-67 infra and accompanying text.
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ing the allocation of advertising costs in ratemaking proceedings, 1°4
state'0 5 and federal"3 decisionmakers have given new meaning to the
reasonableness standard. A reasonable advertising expense today must
promote energy conservation,0 7 environmental policies,' or eco-
nomic prudence.10 9
Responding to commission restrictions on advertising, effectuated ei-
ther by direct prohibition or by denial of cost allocation to the ratemak-
ing formula, public utilities have employed, in addition to their
104. See notes 54-81 supra and accompanying text.
105. This policy has been adopted by state regulatory commissions, see, e.g., Re Determina-
tion of Whether Advertising Rules Conform to Pub. Util. Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, No.
35723 (Ind. P.S.C. Jan. 16, 1980); Re Michigan Gas Utils. Co., No. U-6022 (Mich. P.S.C. Feb. 5,
1980); Re Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 34 PuB. UT.. REP. (PUR) 4th 569 (Wis. P.S.C. 1980); state
supreme courts, see, e.g., Los Angeles v. Public Service Comm'n, 7 Cal. 3d 331, 497 P.2d 785, 102
Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); and at least
one state legislature, see, e.g., The Conn. Natural Gas Corp., I 1 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 66
(Conn. P.U.C. 1975) (Connecticut legislature giving state regulatory commission permission to
disallow all political, institutional, and promotional advertising by gas and electric utilities).
106. Congress adopted this content approach to allowing advertising in enacting Titles I and
II of PURPA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (Supp. 111 1979); 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2645 (Supp. I1
1979). PURPA divides utility advertising into "promotional," "political," and "other" categories.
16 U.S.C. § 2625 (Supp. 1I 1979). Promotional and political advertising are expressly forbidden
advertising subjects for gas and electric utilities. 15 U.S.C. § 3203(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979); 16
U S.C. § 2623(b)(5)(Supp. III 1979).
The Supreme Court, perhaps unwittingly, adopted this approach to utility advertising regula-
tion in Central Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The
Court declared energy conservation to be a substantial state interest worthy ofjustiying a regula-
tion of utility advertising. Id at 569. See notes 273-76 supra and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla.
P S.C. 1975); Re Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 Pun. UiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 49 (nl. Commerce
Comm'n 1980); Re Determination of Whether Advertising Rules Conform to Pub. Util. Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978, No. 35723 (Ind. P.S.C. Jan. 16, 1980); Michigan Power Co., 18 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 418 (Mich. P.S.C. 1977); Re Interstate Power Co., 32 PuB. UTIL. REP.
(PUR) 4th 494 (Minn. P.S.C. 1979); Re Advertising Practices of TeL, Elec., & Gas Distribution
Cos., 35 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 361 (NJ. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1980); Re Gas Co., 35 Pun. UTiL.
REP. (PUR) 4th 106 (N.M.P.S.C. 1980); Re South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 34 Pun. UTL. REP.
(PUR) 4th 458 (S.C.P.S.C. 1980).
108. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. 87 PuB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 3d 270 (Cal. P.U.C. 1971);
Public Serv. Co., 13 PuB. UrIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 40 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975); Promotional Practices of
Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56
Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975).
109. Economic concerns include inflation, see, e.g., Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8
PUB. UTnL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975); Detroit Edison Co., 3 PuB. Un.. REP. (PUR)
4th 209 (Mich. P.S.C. 1974); benefits to the consumer, see, eg., Re Interstate Power Co., 32 PuB.
UTIL. RaP. (PUR) 4th 494 (Minn. P.S.C. 1979); Re Minnesota Gas Co., 32 PuB. UTr.. REP. (PUR)
4th 1 (S.D.P.U.C. 1979); and cost control, see, e.g., Re Gas Co., 35 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 106
(N.M.P.S.C. 1980).
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traditional defenses, a new first amendment defense based on the com-
mercial speech doctrine.
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Early Doctrine
The Supreme Court first confronted the commercial speech doctrine
in 1942 in Valentine v. Chrestensen. 11 In defiance of a New York ordi-
nance banning the streetside distribution of commercial advertising,"'1
Chrestensen distributed handbills that on one side solicited customers
to tour his Navy submarine for a fee and on the other side criticized a
city ordinance banning his submarine from utilizing city owned
docks.112 Police restrained Chrestensen for violating a city commercial
handbill ordinance."' Chrestensen sought to enjoin the prohibition of
handbill distribution on free speech grounds." 4 The Court held, with-
out explanation, that the Constitution did not protect commercial
speech."15
The Court reinforced this exception doctrine 16 for commercial
speech in Breard v. Alexandria. 17 To justify the exception the Court
110. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
111. The specific ordinance involved in Valentine was the New York Sanitary Code, § 318,
which provides in pertinent part: "No person shall.. . distribute, or cause. . . to be... distrib-
uted, any handbill, circular,. . . or other advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street or
public place .... This section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other
than commercial and business advertising matter." 316 U.S. at 53 n.1.
112. Id at 53.
113. Id
114. Id at 54. Although Chrestensen sought relief under the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court framed the issue in terms of "whether the ordinance. . .was... an unconstitu-
tional abridgement of the freedom of... speech." Id
115. Justice Roberts concluded:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of
the freedom of communicating information ... and municipalities may ... not unduly
burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely com-
mercial advertising.
id
For a criticism of the conclusory nature of the Valentine opinion, see Farber, Commercial
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 372, 377 (1979); Heller, The End of the
"Commercial Speech" Exception-Good Riddance or More Headaches For the Courts?, 67 Ky. L.
REv. 927, 927-36 (1979).
116. Commentators have labeled the commercial speech exception to the first amendment's
general protection of speech as the "exception doctrine." See, ag., Heller, supra note 115, at 927-
30.
117. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). InBreard, the Court upheld a city ordinance banning door-to-door
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cited the commercial speaker's profit motive as the distinguishing fac-
tor for denying commercial speech the full first amendment protection
accorded other types of speech.'18
Mter Breard, the Supreme Court did not address the commercial
speech issue again until the late 1960s. 19 Toward the end of this pe-
riod, a concept referred to as the "right to know"120 warranted the at-
solicitation for magazine subscriptions. Id at 645. Chrestensen and Breard have since been cited
as denying all protection to commercial speech. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
653 n.16 (1978).
118. In upholding the ordinance, the Court distinguished Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943), in which the Court had struck down an ordinance forbidding the free distribution of
advertisements of religious meetings. Id at 146-47. After comparing the differences between the
commercial nature of the magazine solicitations in Breard and the religious nature of the handbill
distribution in Martin, Justice Reed concluded that the two cases should be distinguished: "As no
element of the commercial entered into [Martin]. . . and the opinion was narrowly limited to the
precise fact of the free distribution of an invitation to religious services, we feel that it is not
necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion reached in this case." 341 U.S. at 643. For a discus-
sion of the purported economic justification for the commercial speech exception, see Heller, supra
note 115, at 928-30.
Even though the Court sought to rest the justification for the exception doctrine on the grounds
of profit motive, the Court nevertheless in subsequent decisions approved first amendment protec-
tion for other profit motivated media activities. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (newspaper print advertisements); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (books); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (movies). See also Note, Commercial Speech-An
Endin Sightfor ChrestensenZ, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1258 (1974). The contradictory nature of the
Valentine-Breard exception doctrine and the Court's subsequent treatment of economic motive
cases prompted one commentator to describe the status of commercial speech under the first
amendment to be in a "chaotic state." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 16
(1970).
119. Until 1973 the Supreme Court considered the commercial speech exception only in pass-
ing. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court,
upholding first amendment protection for a libelous political advertisement, distinguished
Chrestensen on the basis that the New York Times advertisement was injected with political over-
tones, whereas Chrestensen "was based upon the factual conclusions that the handbill was 'purely
commercial advertising."' Id at 266.
During this same period, lower courts confirmed the commercial speech exception doctrine.
See Pollack v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'don other grounds,
343 U.S. 451 (1953); Halstead v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
The Supreme Court recognized the commercial speech hiatus as well in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). "Since the decision in
Breard. . . the Court has never denied protection on the ground that the speech in issue was
'commercial speech.'" Id at 759.
120. This concept may also be referred to as the "right to receive." See Heller, supra note 115,
at 93 1; Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional
Considerations, 63 GEo. LU. 775 (1975). The "right to know" has been defined as "a right to
receive information communicated by another." See Note, Attorneys' Rights Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility Free Speech, Right to Know and Freedom of Association, 1977 WASH.
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tention of constitutional commentators 121 and some members of the
Court.12 This concept fostered the eventual change in thought that
favored first amendment protection of commercial speech.123
The change came in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 4 in which the Court based its decision on
a "right to know" concept and held that even purely commercial speech
was entitled to some first amendment protection. 125 The Virginia State
U.L.Q. 682, 706. See generaly 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 134 (1976); 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1503
(1979); 16 WAsI-BUR L. REV. 197 (1976).
121. The concept of "right to know" in the first amendment context may be traced to Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), in which the Court stated that "freedom of speech necessar-
ily protects the right to receive [speech]." Id at 143.
Professor Meikeljohn justified the "right to know" concept as an incident to the "market place
of ideas." A. MEiKELjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERINMENT (1948). See
Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1. In order for the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" to function properly, recipients of those ideas need protection. See Heller,
supra note 115, at 931.
The notion of the "marketplace of ideas" was first expressed judicially by Justice Holmes in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). For a skeptical view of the utility of the
marketplace of ideas concept, see Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964, 967-81 (1978).
122. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943). The Court formally acknowledged this concept as constitutionally viable in 1969 by stat-
ing, "It is now well established that the constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
123. In Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), a decision reaf-
firming the holding in Valentine, tensions surfaced between the Valentine commercial speech ex-
ception and the "right to know" concept. The Pittsburgh Press Court, which affirmed Valentines'
denial of first amendment protection for commercial speech, decided the case by a 5-4 margin.
Fourjustices lodged strong dissents. Id at 393-404 (Burger, C.J., & Douglas, Stewart, and Bren-
nan, J.L., dissenting). Moreover, one of the dissenters called for the outright demise of the Valen-
tine commercial speech exception. Id at 397-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The close outcome in
Pittsburgh Press indicated that some members of the Court had reevaluated their views regarding
commercial speech protection.
Two years after Pittsburgh Press, four justices expressed doubt as to the validity of the commer-
cial speech exception in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), an abortion advertising case. At
that point, with five justices Willing to overrule the commercial speech exception, the fall of Valen-
tine was imminent.
124. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
125. Id. at 773. The Court, per Justice Blackmun, stated:
[Tihe free flow of commercial information[, e]ven an individual advertisement, though
entirely "commercial," may be of general public interest. ...Advertising... is...
dissemination of information .... It is a matter of public interest that those decisions,
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commer-
cial information is indispensable.
Id. at 764-65. See general#
, 
Alexander, Speech in the Local Marke6lace: Implications of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.frLocalegulatoryPower,
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Board plaintiffs, consumers of prescription drugs, challenged a Vir-
ginia statute126 prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prices of pre-
scription drugs. 27 In protecting commercial speech by striking down
the statute, the Court nevertheless stopped short of extending full first
amendment protection to commercial speech by specifically mention-
ing two commercial speech areas in which it would accord no first
amendment protection whatsoevei.' 28 The Court failed to delineate
fully the extent to which the decision does provide protection.
Post-Virginia State Board commercial speech cases 129 indicate that
different forms of commercial speech receive varying degrees of protec-
tion. 30 These distinctions are primarily a function of three overriding
concerns articulated by the Court. One concern focused on honoring
the common sense differences between commercial and noncommercial
speech.13 1 Another concern was fear of diluting the protection for
"6pure speech"'132 by treating commercial speech and noncommercial
14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 357 (1977); Elman, The New Constitutional Right to Advertise, 64 A.B.A.J.
206 (1978); Comment, First Amendment Protectionfor CommercialAdertising: The New Constitu-
tional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205 (1976).
126. The challenged Virginia statute stated in pertinent part: "Any pharmacist shall be con-
sidered guilty of unprofessional conduct who... publishes, advertises, or promotes... any
amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for drugs
containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription." VA. CODE
§ 54-524.35 (1974) (current version Cum. Supp. 1981).
127. 425 U.S. at 749-50.
128. The forms of permissible regulation the Court mentioned were reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions and restrictions on untruthful, deceptive, or misleading speech. Id. at
771.
129. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Commi'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I
(1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
130. See Note, Restrictions on Electric Utility Advertising, 78 MICH. L. REv. 433, 435 (1980).
131. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); Linmark Assocs., Inc.
v. Township of Wllingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). The Court in Ohralik noted: "We
have not discarded the 'common sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial trans-
action, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties
of speech." 436 U.S. at 455-56. See generally Note, supra note 130.
132. "Pure speech" as used in this context is that speech which is noncommercial. Pure
speech, or speech that is noncommercial, is generally accorded a preferred position enjoying the
full panoply of first amendment protection. Thus, in order for infringements on such speech to be
justified, a "compelling," "significant," or "important" governmental interest must be shown. See,
e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonvile, 422 U.S. 205,217 (1975); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
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speech on constitutional parity.1 33  Finally, the Court explained that
commercial speech, due to its economic motivation, is more durable
and less likely to be "chilled" than noncommercial speech.1 34 Moti-
vated by these concerns, the Court developed a two-tiered approach for
protection of commercial speech: commercial speech that is related to
regulatable governmental activity is more amenable to control,135 while
commercial speech not related to an area of regulatable governmental
activity is accorded more traditional first amendment protection. 136
U.S. 104, 115 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). Nevertheless, pure speech in
certain instances may be regulated without a showing of constitutional significance. As defined in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the following classes of speech may be fully
subjected to government regulation: "These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words ... ." Id. at 572.
Because commercial speech is not accorded the same status as "pure speech," principles devel-
oped in the traditional first amendment context "do not extend automatically to this as yet un-
charted area." Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1979). Hence, "overbreadth" analysis and
protection against "prior restraints" are unavailable to commercial speech. See Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978) (overbreadth not available); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (no protection
against prior restraints).
133. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). The Court declared: "To
require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and non-commercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with
respect to the latter kind of speech." Id. Accord, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 n.5 (1980) (commercial expression is of less constitutional signifi-
cance than other forms of speech). See generaly Note, supra note 130.
134. The Court in Virginia State Board stated: "Commercial speech may be more durable
than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likeli-
hood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely." 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. See
generally Note, supra note 130.
135. See Farber, supra note 115, at 386-87; Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1979); Note, supra note 130, at
436,438. See also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), in which an ACLU attorney advised a group
of sterilized women of their legal rights against the federal government. As a result of the meet-
ing, the attorney subsequently informed one of the women of the availability of free ACLU legal
assistance. The Disciplinary Board of the South Carolina Supreme Court reprimanded the attor-
ney. In declaring that South Carolina's application of its disciplinary rules violated the attorney's
first amendment rights, the Court distinguished Primus from Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978), on the grounds of regulatable governmental activity:
Normally the purpose or motive of the speaker is not central to First Amendment
protection but it does bear on the distinction between conduct that is "an associational
aspect of " 'expression'.., and other activity subject to plenary regulation by govern-
ment .... In Ohralik ... the lawyer was not engaged in associational activity for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas; his purpose was the advancement of his own commer-
cial interests.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32 (emphasis added).
136. When the commercial speech is related to more fundamental constitutional rights not
subject to government regulation, the Court will be inclined to accord traditional first amendment
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Post-Virginia State Board decisions concerning regulatable commer-
cial speech clarified the doctrine. Subsequent decisions,137 for example,
reaffirmed the policy to which the Court alluded in pre-Virginia State
Board decisions 38 that false or misleading commercial speech is not
constitutionally protected.'39 Furthermore, the state's interest, when
balanced against the interests of commercial speech, must be substan-
tial."4 In addition, under Bates v. State Bar,'4 ' the state's legislation
must have a direct causal connection to its asserted interest' 42 and must
further the interest in a reasonable manner. Accordingly, a state
protection. See Note, supra note 130, at 438. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977) (Court upheld a right to privacy in striking down a statute prohibiting advertisement of
contraceptives); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (Court,
employing a right to travel rationale, declared unconstitutional an ordinance forbidding the dis-
play of residential "For Sale" signs); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Court invalidated a
Virginia statute prohibiting New York abortion advertisements because the citizens of Virginia
had a right to travel to New York and privacy issues were involved).
137. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Obralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771, 772 n.24 (1976), in which the Court stated that "[u]ntrutbful speech, commercial or
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake .... We forsee no obstacle to a State's
dealing effectively with this problem." Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
In Friedman, the Court upheld a ban restricting optometrists' use of trade names that the Court
found could mislead the public as to the source and quality of the optometric service. The Court
declared that "it is clear that the state's interest in protecting the public from the deceptive and
misleading use of optometrical trade names is substantial and well demonstrated." 440 U.S. at 15.
In Ohralik, the Court upheld an Ohio State Bar Association rule that prohibited in-person
solicitation of clients. The Court determined that the potentiality for deception created by the
untrained at the hands of a "professional" counselor and persuader was too great to go unchecked.
436 U.S. at 464-65. See also Farber, supra note 121, at 384-95.
138. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973). The Court in Pittsburgh Press stated that
"[a]ny First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation
is altogether absent when the commercialactivity itself is illegal and. . . incidental to a valid limita-
tion on economic activity." Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
139. 425 U.S. at 766-70.
140. See, ag., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (state's interest in protecting public
from deceptive and misleading use of trade names is a substantial one); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 458, 462 (1978) (State's interest in protecting public from attorney solicitation
legitimate and important).
141. 433 U.S. 350 (1978).
142. Id. at 378. In Bates, the Court confronted the legality of an Arizona State Bar Associa-
tion rule that prohibited price advertising by attorneys. In extending first amendment protection
to the newspaper advertisements for routine legal services, the Court determined that the regula-
tion was only remotely related to the asserted state interest of prohibiting unprofessional conduct.
Id. at 382.
143. The Virginia State Board Court concluded that a complete suppression of "concededly
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may use only those means necessary to effectuate its goals; if possible, a
state should invoke less inhibiting regulation.
B. The Central Hudson Test
The Court crystallized Virginia State Board and its subsequent clari-
fications into a formal test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission.'" In Central Hudson, the New York Public
Service Commission had imposed a promotional advertising ban origi-
nally in response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the resultant energy
crisis. 145 When the Commission extended the ban after the energy cri-
sis abated, Central Hudson Gas & Electric challenged the ban on first
amendment grounds.'" Deciding in favor of Central Hudson, the
Court established a four-part test for balancing a utility's right to com-
mercial speech against a governmental regulation prohibiting such
speech.147
Rooted in Virginia State Board and its progeny,1 48 the four-part
analysis focuses on the governmental interest that the regulation is to
truthful information about [an] entirely lawful activity" was too sweeping in nature. 425 U.S. at
773. In subsequent cases this concept was given further consideration. In In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978), the Court held that the "state's. . .interest in regulating members [whose] profession
it licenses ...amply justifies the application of narrowly drawn rules to proscribe solicitation
." Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
144. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). After discussing the doctrinal history of commercial speech, the
Court enunciated a four-part test:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset,
we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566. See notes 151-55 infra and accompanying text.
145. See Notice of Proposal, supra note 5, at 2074-76. The Commission, in determining that
the "demands for electrical energy ... cannot be met for the foreseeable future without signifi-
cant reductions in usage in view of the lack of sufficient fuels to generate electricity," ordered the
electric utilities of New York to discontinue "promoting the use of electricity through advertising
." Id. at 2072, 2076.
146. Before the decision to extend the ban, the Public Service Commission in July 1976 solic-
ited public opinion on the promotional advertising ban issued three years earlier. After hearing
arguments from opponents and proponents of the ban, the Commission reaffirmed the ban in
February 1977. See Statement on Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Public
Utilities, 17 N.Y. PSC 2-, 3-B (Feb. 25, 1977).
147. 447 U.S. at 566.
148. The Court disapproved of the "complete suppression of Central Hudson's advertising."
.d. at 571.
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serve and the means employed to achieve that interest. 49 The Central
Hudson test, as a practical matter, consists of five parts, because a court
must make an initial decision as to whether the speech at issue is in-
deed commercial. 5 '
If a court determines that the speech is commercial, the first step is
for the court to decide whether the speech is either "misleading or re-
lated to the unlawful."'' If the speech falls within either of those cate-
gories, the court can properly validate the government regulation. If
the speech is not within the categories, the second part of the test re-
quires the state to show a substantial interest in promulgating the regu-
lation.152 The third part of the test requires an analysis of whether the
asserted state interest is directly effectuated by the regulatory means.1 53
The fourth part requires that the state's regulatory means restrict ad-
vertising no more than necessary.' 54 If a state regulation satisfies each
element of the test, the regulation is immune to a first amendment com-
mercial speech defense. 55
Although the Central Hudson test is relatively new, courts have al-
ready employed it in several commercial speech defense cases.15 6 Re-
cently, utilities have invoked this defense when challenging advertising
149. See notes 124-43 supra and accompanying text.
150. The Court provided: "At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the first amendment." 447 U.S. at 566. The traditional definition of commercial speech
is that which does no more than propose a commercial transaction." Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). The Court in Central
Hudson expanded the notion of commercial speech by defining it as "expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." 447 U.S. at 561.
If the speech in question qualifies as commercial, the Central Hudson test must be used to
evaluate it. If, on the other hand, the speech is noncommercial, and thus fully protected, the
speech will be evaluated on traditional first amendment grounds. See note 132 supra.
151. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). See notes 137-38 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 140-43 supra and accompanying text.
153. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
154. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
155. 447 U.S. at 570-71.
156. See, ag., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981); Record Revolu-
tion No. 6, Inc. v. Parma, 638 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1980); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189
(Me. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 A.2d 821 (1980). See
also Massena v. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., No. 79-CV-163 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1981).
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restrictions. 157
Il. ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING REGULATIONS UNDER
CENTRAL HUDSON
Public service commissions can regulate utility advertising by di-
rectly prohibiting the advertising 1 8 or by disallowing allocation of the
advertising expense to the rate schedule.159 In response to both types of
regulation, a utility may invoke the first amendment commercial
speech defense.' 60 The advantages and viability of this defense will
157. See, eg., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dsmissed,
449 U.S. 1072 (1981); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 413
N.E.2d 359, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981).
158. See notes 163-95 infra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 196-271 infra and accompanying text. For purposes of this Note, "rate sched-
ule" refers to the inclusion of certain advertising expenses in the revenue formula discussed at
notes 71-85 supra and accompanying text. The effect of including an expenditure in the rate
schedule is to pass that cost on to the consumer in the form of customer rates. See Id. The term
"rate base" should not be used synonymously with the term "rate schedule," "revenue formula"
or "consumer charge." "Rate base" is a technical term of art used in the ratemaking process. The
rate base is the formula that expresses the Smyth "fair value" requirement and is defined to be the
sum of the utility's original investment and the working capital allowance less accumulated depre-
ciation. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text. Members of the Supreme Court appar-
ently indiscriminately used this term in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 447
U.S. 530, 543 (1980); id. at 544 (Marshall, J., concurring).
160. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
Indeed, some argue that the first amendment is the only plausible defense available to utilities
in this context. Those who make this assertion argue that the traditional defenses of due process
and undue assault on management prerogative, see note 10 supra, are no longer valid. See Note,
supra note 96, at 623. Those who espouse this theory correctly point out that the "current condi-
tions... [produce] the dilemmas of demand growth and rising costs in... the power industry."
Id. This situation differs considerably from the status of utilities during the West Ohio Gas era.
West Ohio Gas was decided under a fourteenth amendment due process analysis. 294 U.S. at
71. Fourteenth amendment due process "demands... that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). The Supreme
Court liberalized this analysis in a later opinion by allowing the means to bear only a "rational
relation" to the desired end. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54
(1938). Accord, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). In West Ohio Gas, the
Court determined that the Ohio Public Service Commission did not satisfy the "rational relation"
test in attempting to disallow advertising expenses from being passed on to consumers in the form
of service rates. The Court rightfully feared that the disallowance of advertising costs would in-
hibit the "normal growth" of utilities. 294 U.S. at 72. During this period of economic history,
continued growth was essential to maintain the financial fitness of the utility so that it could meet
the burgeoning energy needs of its customers. See notes 91-98 supra and accompanying text.
Hence, unless the advertising expenses were unjustifiably excessive, a determination by a public
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vary depending upon the scope of regulation, 161 the category of adver-
tising, 162 and whether the speaker is a gas or electric utility.
A. Direct Prohibition
Typically, public service commissions effectuate direct prohibitions
on utility speech by issuing policy statements. 163 Regardless of the cat-
egory of advertising"6 or the type of utility-speaker,'65 a defense under
the commercial speech doctrine is likely to succeed if the direct prohi-
bition imposes a total ban on speech.
The Supreme Court in Central Hudson struck down a total prohibi-
tion on promotional advertising.' 66 Applying the four-part analysis es-
tablished in that opinion, the Court reasoned that the Public Service
Commission of New York failed to show that its total prohibition of
promotional advertising was no more extensive than necessary to
achieve the asserted state interest. 167 Although the Court recognized
New York's legitimate interest in conserving energy in the wake of the
service commission prohibiting those expenses from being passed on to the consumers as a valid
operating expense would violate the rational relation standard.
In the current context, the need for uninhibited expansion no longer exists: energy conservation
is now a primary concern; the efficiencies of the "economies of scale" have waned; and the in-
crease in demand is proceeding at a slower rate. See notes 91-101 supra and accompanying text.
This situation provides an impetus for some to conclude that a rational basis does exist for a
regulation denying the cost of advertising expenses to be passed on to consumers. See Note, supra
note 96, at 612, 623. Accordingly, this conclusion renders a fourteenth amendment due process
defense largely impotent in providing a justification for advertising cost allocation by utilities. Id.
An analysis of whether or not the foregoing argument is valid is beyond the scope of this Note.
The mere spectre of doubt raised by this argument, however, underscores the importance of the
first amendment defense for utilities.
161. Public service commissions regulate utility advertising by direct prohibition, see notes
163.95 infra and accompanying text, and by denial of cost allocation of advertising expenses to
consumer rates, see notes 196-271 infra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Notice of Proposal, supra note 5, at 2074-76 (ordering discontinuance of "pro-
moting the use of electricity through advertising").
164. The various types of advertising engaged in by a utility include promotional, political,
informational, and instructional. For a complete discussion of these categories of advertising, see
notes 3 & 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
165. Whether the speaker is an electric utility, as opposed to a gas utility, may affect the valid-
ity of a commercial speech defense. For a discussion of the import of the electric-gas distinction,
see notes 234-72 infra and accompanying text.
166. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Promotional advertising may be defined as "advertising which is
designed to obtain new customers, increase usage by present customers, or to encourage customers
to select and install appliances using one form of energy in preference to another." PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Mar. 1, 1973, at 47. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
167. 447 U.S. at 569-70.
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1973 Arab oil embargo, the majority feared the prohibition's broad lan-
guage would sweep within its ambit other speech that the Commission
had not intended to regulate.
168
Similarly, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission 6 9
and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellottiu 70 struck down total bans
on political advertising. 1 ' In Consolidated Edison, the New York Pub-
lic Service Commission issued a policy statement forbidding utilities to
discuss political matters in bill inserts. 172 The order directly affected
Con-Ed's practice of including pronuclear power inserts in its billing
envelopes. 73 The Commission's ban, however, did not extend to in-
serts discussing "non-controversial" subjects. 74 Presented with this
overt instance of content regulation, 175 the Court found that the policy
statement impermissibly infringed on the utility's first amendment
rights.
176
168. Id. at 570.
169. Id. at 530.
170. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
171. For a definition of political advertising, see notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
172. On February 17, 1977, the New York Public Service Commission issued a statement
prohibiting "utilities from using bill inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability
of future development of nuclear power." 447 U.S. at 532.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Court noted that the Commission openly admitted that its order discriminated
between types of speech content:
The Commission does not pretend that its action is unrelated to the content or subject
matter of bill inserts. Indeed, it has undertaken to suppress certain bill inserts precisely
because they address controversial issues of public policy. The Commission allows in-
serts that present information to consumers on certain subjects, such as energy conserva-
tion measures, but it forbids the use of inserts that discuss public controversies.
Id. at 537.
175. The Court, in assessing the Commission's reasoning for implementing the ban, declared:
"The Commission's own rationale demonstrates that its action cannot be upheld as a content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulation." Id.
176. Id. at 554. 4ccord, Vermont Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv.
Corp., 39 Pun. UnL. REP. (PUR) 4th 59, 74 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp. 1981) (citing Consolldated
Edison in rejecting and denoting a nuclear power bill insert content regulation as a pervasive form
of censorship).
In ConsolidatedEdison, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the ma-
jority's position and embraced the New York Public Service Commission's argument that the "use
of the billing envelope to distribute management's pamphlets amount[ed] to a forced subsidy of
the utility's speech by the ratepayers." Id. at 551. Justice Blackmun suggested that the compul-
sion of ratepayers to finance a utility's advertising might violate the ratepayers' first and four-
teenth amendment rights. d. at 552 n.1 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977)).
Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, made special note of the fact that the court limited its
analysis to the issue of prohibition of speech and in no way attempted to resolve the more difficult
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In Bellotti, the Massachusetts legislature had passed a statute prohib-
iting corporate political contributions or expenditures. 177 The state
designed the law to prevent corporations from influencing the outcome
of referendum proposals. First National Bank of Boston challenged
the statute on first amendment grounds. 178 Reasoning that the right to
speak on public issues should not turn on the source speaking, 179 the
Court held that the statute regulated content and thus violated the first
amendment.' The Court's decision rested on its determination that
the state failed to show a "compelling" interest achieved by a precisely
drawn means.' 8 '
In both Bellotti and Consolidated Edison, the majority declined to
invoke the commercial speech doctrine and instead based its decision
on traditional first amendment grounds.18 2 By not deciding these cases
under the more lenient commercial speech standard, the Court demon-
strated a willingness to provide greater protection for politically ori-
ented advertising. Despite the commercial nature of the speakers, the
Court's result was correct because the content of the speech was non-
commercial. Accordingly, a court must evaluate a state's total prohibi-
tion of a utility's political advertising under the narrower compelling
state interest standard.8 3 This stricter standard' 8 4 will cause a direct
issue of whether a "Commission may exclude the costs of bill inserts from the rate base .... "
447 U.S. at 544. The Commission, however, in denying a petition for rehearing in this case, noted
that it would ban these bill inserts even when paid for by the shareholders because, regardless of
the financial impetus, the use of inserts in a billing envelope made consumers "a captive audi-
ence." Id. at 543. Whether requiring shareholders to finance the costs of inserts would otherwise
place a damper on utility speech remains an unresolved issue. Justice Blackmun, in his Consoli-
dated Edison dissent, argued that "due to the greater likelihood that a recipient would read an
insert with the bill, the utility well might desire to place its insert with the bill even if the total cost
of the mailing were charged to the shareholders." Id. at 554 n.4 (citing Long Island Lighting Co.
v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 77 C 972 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979)).
177. MAss GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977) specifically prohibited corporations
from making contributions "for the purpose of... influencing or affecting the vote on any ques-
uon submitted to the voters, other than the one materially affecting any of the property, business
or assets of the corporation."
178. 435 U.S. at 770.
179. Id. at 777. The Bank wanted to make expenditures to publicize its opposition to a pro-
posed Massachusetts constitutional amendment imposing a graduated income tax upon private
individuals. Id. at 769.
180. Id. at 785.
181. Id. at 786.
182. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1980); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
183. Under traditional first amendment analysis, a state must demonstrate that the regulation
effectuates a compelling interest. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
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prohibition on a utility's political speech to be more constitutionally
suspect than a similar ban on promotional speech. 185
Under Central Hudson, a court is likely to strike down a total ban
on informational advertising,18 6 even though such a ban is not pro-
tected under traditional first amendment principles. The commercial
speech cases of Virginia State Board 1 7 and Bates, 8' which comprise
the underpinnings of the Central Hudson test, 8 9 specifically allowed
advertising of informational material. 190 Thus, a state's interest in pro-
hibitory regulation is unlikely to outweigh the value of informational
advertising. Even if a regulation could pass the "substantial state inter-
est" part of the test, a total ban on informational advertising would
likely fail the "no more extensive than necessary" requirement. Infor-
mational advertising benefits consumers. 19' Hence, a court would
530, 533-34 (1980); First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115
(1972); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963). Politically oriented advertising by a utility arguably commands more stringent protec-
tion because that speech is not prompted primarily by economic reasons. Hence this type of
speech is less hardy than speech resting on an economic foundation. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976).
184. See notes 181-82 supra and accompanying text.
185. Under the stricter compelling state interest standard, the Supreme Court has recognized
only two narrow exceptions to the first amendment policy of voiding content-based regulations.
In Greer v. Speck, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), the Court allowed the federal government to prohibit
partisan political speech on a United States military base. Id. at 840. In Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court allowed a city transit system to refuse partisan
political advertising in favor of commercial advertising to fill its rental advertising space. The
Court thought that the city's fears of jeopardizing long-term commercial revenue and offending
paying passengers with potentially offensive political propoganda were justified. Id. at 304.
186. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
187. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
188. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
189. See notes 124-55 supra and accompanying text.
190. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977) (advertisements of routine legal services);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)
(advertisements of drug prices).
191. See Re Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 153, 176 (Ark. P.S.C.
1976); Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. UnI. REP. (PUR) 4th 268, 276 (Fla. P.S.C.
1975); Re Idaho Power Co., 29 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 183, 204 (Idaho P.S.C. 1979); Re
Consumers Power Co., 14 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 1, 29 (Mich. P.S.C. 1976). See also Duffy,
supra note 5, at 8; Netschert, supra note 5, at 18.
Although the New York Public Service Commission expressly prohibited promotional advertis-
ing, it approved of informational advertising. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 567 (1980).
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probably conclude that a flat ban on informational advertising is un-
constitutionally overinclusive, because the prohibition could prevent
consumers from receiving valuable information.
A total ban on institutional advertising 92 would similarly fail part
four of the Central Hudson test as being overly restrictive. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, addressing the constitutionality of a total
ban on institutional advertising in a pre-Central Hudson case, 193 specif-
ically concluded that the state could achieve its goal of regulating insti-
tutional advertisement by less drastic measures.194 The Oklahoma
court, in effect, based its decision on the same grounds subsequently
employed by the United States Supreme Court in the fourth part of the
Central Hudson test. Furthermore, the Oklahoma court noted that, as
in the informational advertising context, consumers benefit, at least to
some degree, from institutional advertising.1 9 Relying on this determi-
nation, a court using the Central Hudson analysis would probably hold
a total ban on institutional advertising in violation of the least restric-
tive means requirement. Hence, in the face of a total ban on institu-
192. Institutional advertising may be defined simply as advertising "designed to enhance the
public image of the utility." See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text. State v. Oklahoma
Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975).
193. State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975).
194. Commenting on the validity of the direct total ban on institutional advertising, the court
concluded: "The same end could be achieved by disallowing such expenditures as operating ex-
penses for ratemaking purposes and this method would not impede the utilities' ability to commu-
ncate with the public. We conclude theprohibiton on expendituresfor institutionaladvertising is an
unreasonable means ofprotecting ratepayersfrom these expenditures." Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
The Missouri Court of Appeals confronted the same issue in a slightly different context in Laclede
Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S.
1072 (1981). In Laclede, the commission refused to allow, as part of operating expenses for
ratemaking purposes, $204,691 of institutional or goodwill advertising. Although the court was
not faced with a total ban on institutional advertising, it alluded to the negative consequences of
such a prohibition:
The evidence herein does not support Laclede's argument that... the P.S.C. violated
any constitutional right of Laclede to the exercise of its right of free speech. . . . The
order of the P.S.C. does not prohibit advertising by Laclede. If it had, this order would,
without question, have violated the constitutional and managerial rights of Laclede.
Id. at 228.
195. 536 P.2d at 895.
Another ratepayer benefit of institutional advertising cited by courts is the attraction of invest-
ment capital that reduces the amount of financing needed to operate. The result may be lower
rates at the retail level. SeeRe Alabama Power Co., 97 PuB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 3d 371, 377 (Ala.
P.S.C. 1972); Re Consolidated Edison Co., 73 PuB. UT. REP. (PUR) 3d 417, 468 (N.Y.P.S.C.
1968). One commentator suggested that institutional advertising will foster a feeling of goodwill
by the consumer toward the utility and will result in the consumer economizing on utility services
to achieve the national energy conservation goal. See, Duffy, supra note 5, at 6.
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tional advertising, a utility may successfully invoke the first
amendment commercial speech doctrine.
B. Cost Allocation Denial
When a public service commission does not allow a utility to include
expenses in operating costs for ratemaking purposes, the utility may
seek to defend its cost allocation 19 6 attempt under the first amend-
ment. 197 In response to this defense, commissions and courts draw a
distinction between denying the speech altogether and denying the al-
location of advertising costs as part of the ratemaking formula. 98 Util-
ities, in defending their attempts to allocate costs, usually argue that
because the commission refused to charge the advertising to operating
costs, the funds for the advertising must come out of shareholder prof-
its.199 Utilities further assert that a reduction of shareholder profits
hinders their ability to attract new investment capital2 °° and denies
shareholders of their regulated, but constitutionally circumscribed, rate
of return.2"' Utilities contend that these financial considerations dis-
196. For purposes of this Note, "cost allocation" is used synonymously with the concept of
allowance of advertising cost as part of the ratemaking formula. See notes 9 & 54-81 supra and
accompanying text.
197. See, ag., Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980),
appeal disrissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 51
N.Y.2d 823, 413 N.E.2d 349, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981). The
Supreme Court in CentralHudson reaffirmed the right of utilities to seek cost allocation: "Unreg-
ulated businesses pass on promotional costs to consumers, and this Court expressly approved the
practice for utilities in West Ohio .... " 447 U.S. at 568 n.11.
Under the first amendment, if a regulation is void on its face, the speaker may deliver his
message in violation of the regulation and defend his actions on the unconstitutionality of the
regulation. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1938). Hence, utilities may charge the
costs of advertising to operating expenses and subsequently defend their inclusion during test year
analysis.
198. See, ag., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 568 n.ll (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222, 228
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 825, 413 N.E.2d 359, 360, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981).
199. Advertising costs become part of the rate schedule when included in the operating costs
of the ratemaking formula: (rate base x rate of return) + operating costs = revenue. Cost in-
cluded within the revenue amount may be charged to consumers. Those expenses not included
must come out of shareholder profits. See notes 54-81 supra and accompanying text.
200. See Note, supra note 96, at 633 & n.136.
201. See notes 54-64 supra and accompanying text.
Some commentators and legislators have argued that ratepayers, in the long run, subsidize those
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courage them from engaging in advertising speech.20 2 When a utility
raises a first amendment defense, courts, contrary to past practice,203
must now evaluate the legitimacy of a cost allocation denial under the
Central Hudson four-part analysis.2' The likelihood of a successful
commercial speech defense under Central Hudson depends primarily
on the category of advertising and the type of utility-speaker.
1. Allocation of Informational and Political Advertising: Uniform
Treatment of Gas and Electric Utilities
The validity of allocating informational and political advertising ex-
advertising cost allocations that are denied. They asserted that ifshareholders must pay for adver-
tising, dividends will be reduced accordingly. This has a negative effect on potential investors,
thereby hindering the utility's ability to attract additional capital for needed growth. Accordingly,
utility stock prices become depressed. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BooK, supra note 4, at 92; Elec-
inc Utiity Rate Reform and Regulatory Improvement: Hearings on HA 12461, H.RA 2633 and
H.R. 2650 (Titles V1I and VIII), HRA 6696, HR. 10869, H.RA 11449, H.RA 11475, H.A 12848, H.A
12872 Before the Subcomm on Energy Power ofthe House Comn on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 227 (1976). Accord, Brief for Appellants at 47, Laclede Gas Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1072
(1981). To compensate for the lack of investment, utilities must borrow needed capital at inflated
interest rates. See A. FINDER, supra note 6, at 8. Inflated capital costs force utilities to increase
rates. See National EnergyAct Hearings, supra note 99, pt. 3, vol 1, at 68-75. As a result, consum-
ers pay for the advertising in the end. See Note, supra note 96, at 633 & n.136.
202. See, ag., Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 824, 413 N.E.2d 359, 360, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (1980), appeal dis-
missed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981).
Alternatively, if the costs of advertising cannot be passed on to the consumer, the economic
incentive that places the advertising in the commercial speech realm is absent. Accordingly, the
advertising is no longer commercial speech because it would be unprofitable for the utility to
continue to engage in it. The speech should then be entitled to the more protective evaluation
standard for traditional or pure speech. See generally note 132 supra.
203. Prior to the adoption of the CentralHudon test, courts evaluated the validity of advertis-
ing expense allocation on various grounds, including conservation, see, e.g., Re Gas Co., 35 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 106 (N.M.P.S.C. 1980); no benefit to ratepayers, see, eg., Re Minnesota Gas
Co., 32 PUB. UTU.. REP. (PUR) 4th 1 (S.D.P.U.C. 1979); environmental concerns, see, e.g., In re
Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); economic concerns, see, eg., Promo-
tional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975). This practice
continues unabated today. See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
At least one regulatory commission requires a utility to include with the advertisement a "tag"
stating that the advertisement is paid out of shareholder funds and not with those of consumers.
See Re Rule Making Relating to Advertising Expenditures, 39 Pu. UnL. REP. (PUR) 4th 295
(N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1980). But see Re Advertising Practices of TeL, Elec. & Gas Distribution
Cos., 35 PuB. UT.. REP. (PUR) 4th 361 (NJ. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1980).
204. See notes 151-55 supra and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court considered
a total prohibition in Central Hudson, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, briefly addressed
the cost allocation issue. See 447 U.S. at 568 n.ll.
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penses to operating costs does not hinge on the nature of the utility-
speaker. It depends, rather, on the four Central Hudson criteria:
whether the advertising is misleading or related to the unlawful;
whether the denial of allocation promotes a substantial state interest;
whether the state interest is effectuated by direct regulatory means; and
whether that regulation is no more extensive than necessary. 5
Courts should uphold allocation of informational 2 6 advertising ex-
penses under a Central Hudson analysis. Both shareholders and rate-
payers benefit from informational advertising. 0 7 Public service
commissions and consumer groups traditionally have proffered several
state interests when denying allocation of advertising expenditures, in-
cluding conservationist,208  environmental,20 9 and economic210  con-
205. See notes 151-55 supra and accompanying text.
206. See note 83 supra for a definition of informational advertising.
207. See, ag., Re Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 PUB. UTL REp. (PUR) 4th 153 (Ark.
P.S.C. 1976); Re Idaho Power Co., 29 PuB. UTm. REP. (PUR) 4th 183 (Idaho P.U.C. 1979); Re
Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 49 (111. Commerce Comm'n 1980); Re
Interstate Power Co., 32 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 494 (Minn. P.S.C. 1979); Re Advertising
Practices of TeL, Elec., & Gas Distribution Cos., 35 PuB. UTL. REP. (PUR) 4th 361 (N.J. Bd. Pub.
Utils. 1980); Re South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 34 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 458 (S.C.P.S.C.
1980). Informational advertising promotes efficient use of resources because it provides consum-
ers with data as to which competitive fuel is the better alternative. See Brief for Appellants at 22,
Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed,
449 U.S. 1072 (1981) (testimony of witness before Missouri Public Service Commission rate hear-
ing); Note, supra note 10, at 107 n.118 (allowance of advertising against interfuel competitors aids
the public in making an informed choice between available alternatives).
208. See, ag., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Re Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 49 (111. Commerce Comm'n 1980);
Re Michigan Power Co., 18 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 418 (Mich. P.S.C. 1977); Re Advertising
Practices of TeL, Elec. & Gas Distribution Cos., 35 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 361 (N.J. Bd. Pub.
Utils. 1980); Re Gas Co., 35 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 106 (N.M.P.S.C. 1980); .Re South Caro-
lina Elec. & Gas Co., 34 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 458 (S.C.P.S.C. 1980); Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp., 14 PuB. UTL. REP. (PUR) 4th 475 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1976).
209. See, e.g., In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); Re Public Serv.
Co., 13 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 40 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975); Re Promotional Practices of Elec.
Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975). See also National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
210. See, ag., Re Promotional Practices ofElec. Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla.
P.S.C. 1975); Re Detroit Edison Co., 3 PUB. Urn. REP. (PUR) 4th 209 (Mich. P.S.C. 1974); Re
Gas Co., 35 PuB. UTi. REP. (PUR) 4th 106 (N.M.P.S.C. 1980); Re Minnesota Gas Co., 32 PuB.
UT. REP. (PUR) 4th 1 (S.D.P.S.C. 1979). Economic concerns involve inflation, benefit to the
consumer, and cost controL See note 109 supra.
The demise of the efficiencies of economies of scale began in the late 1960s. The spiraling costs
of new plant construction and generating plant fuel now outstrip the efficiencies of large generat-
ing capacity economies of scale. See note 99supra. In effect, it is no longer economically prudent
for electric utilities to encourage consumption. See Id
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cerns. These recognized or purported state interests, however, neither
conflict with nor outweigh the value of informational advertising. Al-
though conservationist, environmental, and economic concerns may be
legitimate state interests,211 they are not directly promoted by disallow-
ing informational advertising costs. Furthermore, informational adver-
tising that includes energy conserving time-of-day rate ads,212
consumer oriented customer service ads,2 13 and information-dissemi-
nating public service ads214 does not infringe on these asserted state
interests. Accordingly, a refusal to allocate informational advertising
expenses fails the direct means215 requirement of CentralHudson. Yet,
even if some expenses for informational advertising are not warranted,
211. Courts must consider the issue of whether the preservation of managerial prerogative is a
substantial state interest. Managerial prerogative involves [the] responsibility of the duly author-
ized manager of a utility to decide the type, quantity or form of advertising which would most
benefit the corporation in its continued growth.... The function of [a public service commis-
sion]. . . is that of regulation, and not of management. . . . [It] should not be allowed to inter-
fere with the proper operation of the utility as a business concern by usurping managerial
prerogatives. Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 359 So. 2d 776, 780 (Ala.
1978). 4ccord, West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935) ("[i]n the
absence of a showing of inefficiency or improvidence, a court will not substitute its judgment for
theirs as to the measure of a prudent outlay"). Under the managerial prerogative analysis, adver-
tising expenditures are evaluated on a "reasonableness" standard as to amount. See, eg., Central
Me. Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 244, 136 A.2d 726, 736-37 (1957); New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 360 Mass. 443, 493-94,275 N.E.2d 493, 524
(1971); State ex rel Dyer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Mo. 1960). The recent
trend, however, has been to give the "reasonableness" standard a different meaning. See notes
100-09 supra and accompanying text.
Contemporary courts and public service commissions analyze advertising expenditures on the
basis of benefit to the consumer, see, eg., Re Minnesota Gas Co., 32 PuB. UnTL. REP. (PUR) 4th 1,
23-26 (S.D.P.U.C. 1979) (institutional and promotional advertising disallowed as part of operating
expense because not of benefit to consumers), and content-based social policies, see, eg., Re Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 35 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 49, 67 (Il. Commerce Comm'n 1980)
(allowing advertising expenses related only to conservation, energy efficiency, and safety). See
generally Note, supra note 10, at 95-96. See also In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535
P.2d 1102 (1975) (environmental concerns).
To resolve this tension between upholding the managerial prerogative concept and promoting
content-based social policies, courts must balance the two interests and decide under a Central
Hudson analysis which is more substantial.
212. See, ag., Notice of Proposal, supra note 5, at 2-R, 3-R.
213. See, ag., Re Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 34 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 292 (lL
Commerce Conm'n 1979); Re Determination of Whether Advertising Rules Conform to Pub.
Util Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, No. 35723 (Ind. P.S.C. 1980).
214. See, eg., Re Advertising Practices of Tel., Elec., & Gas Distribution Cos., 35 PuB. UTi..
REP. (PUR) 4th 361 (NJ. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1980).
215. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
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a court must make a partial allocation 216 to satisfy the "least restrictive
means'217 requirement. A complete disallowance of any expenditures
legitimately chargeable to ratepayers would violate this standard.
Hence, a commission should remove from the rate schedule only those
expenditures that clearly conflict with the state's substantial interest. In
addition, if the advertisement purporting to convey an informational
message is deceptive or related to unlawful activity,218 cost allocation is
disallowed under the Central Hudson test.
Allocation of political advertising expenses is more difficult to justify
than informational advertising expenses. Even though Bellotti 219 and
Consolidated Edison 2  may signify the need to evaluate politically ori-
ented advertising on the more protective, traditional first amendment
grounds,"' the denial of allocation of expenses does not, of itself, pro-
hibit that speech altogether. A utility still may engage in political
speech; it simply may not force ratepayers to subsidize that speech.
Neither Bellotti nor Consolidated Edison can be read to stand for any
broader proposition.'m
Whether a hybrid type of political advertising, such as politically
charged promotional advertising,2 3 is allowed as an operating cost will
depend on the substantial state interest involved. Under the Central
Hudson approach, a court must balance the speech and regulation in-
terests.' 4 When running pronuclear power advertisments, for exam-
ple, a utility may have a distinct interest in speaking on important
216. Partial cost allocation of advertising expenses may present problems of computation ac-
curacy. See, e.g., Re Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 39 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 388, 397,
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1980) (noting difficulty in assessing accurately the extent to which consumer rates
benefitted from promotional advertising). Several states, however, have surmounted the logistical
problems of partial allocations. SeeRe Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 35 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR)
4th 292, 317 (Ml1 Commerce Comm'n 1979); Re Columbia Gas, 70 Md. P.S.C. 187 (1979) (Order
No. 63812).
217. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
218. See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
219. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
220. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
221. See notes 169-85 supra and accompanying text.
222. The Supreme Court specifically avoided the cost allocation issue for political advertising
in Consolidated Edisom See 447 U.S. at 543 n.13; id. at 544 (Marshall, J., concurring).
223. See PuB. UnL. FORT., Nov. 8, 1979 at 51, 54 (nuclear power advertising as an example of
promotional advertising with political overtones). See, ag., Re Public Serv. Co., F.C. No. 2548
(N.H.P.S.C. July 31, 1980) (expense of Seabrook Station Education Center explaining nuclear
generation concepts disallowed as institutional advertising designed to promote the image of the
utility).
224. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
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industry-related matters?25 Furthermore, utilities have evidence226
demonstrating that nuclear technology facilitates economical produc-
tion of electricity and ultimately decreases retail costs. 227 The state, on
the other hand, has a substantial interest in not having ratepayers sub-
sidize activities for which they receive no benefit and to which they are
philosophically opposed. 228 Furthermore, some state commissions ar-
gue that allowance of these costs as part of the rate schedule would
violate the ratepayers' first amendment rights.2 29
In deciding whether to allow an allocation of political advertising
costs, a court must balance countervailing interests. To the extent that
political advertising benefits ratepayers and outweighs any other state
interest in refusing allocation, the commission should allow the utility
to charge this advertising cost to the rate schedule. Moreover, when
allocation is justified, a commission should allocate the appropriate
parts of the advertising expenses so as to satisfy the least restrictive
means requirement of Central Hudson. 3 On the other hand, the com-
mission should not charge to the retail rate2l1 those costs that do not
225. See Re Central Me. Power Co., 15 PUB. UnL. REP. (PUR) 4th 455 (Me. P.U.C. 1976); Re
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 14 PUB. UTiI. REP. (PUR) 4th 475 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1976); Re Narragan-
sett Elec. Co., 23 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 516 (R.I.P.S.C. 1978).
226. See, eg., Re Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 9 PuB. UTIL_ REP. (PUR) 4th 204 (Wis. P.S.C.
1975).
227. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BooK, supra note 4, at 92-93. See generally Huntington, The
Rapid Emergence ofMarginal Cost Pricing in the Regulation of Utility Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L.
REv. 689 (1975).
228. See Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 PuB. UTU.. REtP. (PUR) 4th 393 (Or. P.U.C. 1974).
Justice Blackmun, in dissent in Consolidated Edison, voiced concern over this issue: "I do not
accept appellant's argument that preventing a 'free ride' for the utility's message, is not a substan-
tial, legitimate state concern. Even though the free ride may cost the ratepayers nothing addi-
tional by way of specific dollars, it still qualifies as forced support of the utility's speech." 447 U.S.
at 552 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Accord, Note, Utility Companies andthe First Amendment: Reg-
ulating the Use of Political Inserts in Utility Bills, 64 VA. L. REv. 921, 926 (1978).
229. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); id. at 548
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 51 N.Y.2d 823,
413 N.E.2d 349, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981). Each cited
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The courts in ConsolidatedEdison and Roch-
ester avoided deciding the issue. Justice Powell in Consolidated Edison repelled the notion by
stating: "Because the Commission has failed to demonstrate that such costs could not be allocated
between shareholders and ratepayers, we have no occasion to decide whether the rule of.4bood
• ..would prevent Consolidated Edison from passing on... the costs...." 447 U.S. at 543-44
n. 13.
230. See note 216 supra and accompanying text.
231. SeeRe The Narragansett Elec. Co., 23 PuB. UTiL REP. (PUR) 4th 515 (R.I.P.S.C. 1978)
(court disallowed the portion of pro-nuclear power advertising found not of benefit to consumers).
See also Boushey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 10 PuB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 4th 23 (Cal. P.U.C. 1975);
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benefit consumers, even in the face of a utility claim that denial in-
fringes its speech.232 If the utility believes the advertising message is
important enough, it will likely advertise at shareholder expense.233
2. Allocation of Institutional and PromotionalAdverlising. Effect of
Interfuel Competition
In some geographic areas, gas and electric utilities directly compete
with one another for the same consumer market. This interfuel compe-
tition234 requires separate consideration for each utility in discussing
the allocation of institutional and promotional advertising
expenditures.
a. Electric Utilities: Institutional and Promotional Advertising
Until recently, regulatory commissions allowed electric utilities to al-
In re Investigation into the Advertising and Promotional Practices of Regulated Iowa Pub. Utils.,
No. U-463 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Jan. 29, 1975); Re Cascade Natural Gas Corp., 8 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 19 (Or. P.U.C. 1974).
232. See Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980),
appeal dsmissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 64
A.D.2d 345, 410 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1978), a f'd, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 413 N.E.2d 359, 433 N.Y.S.2d 470
(1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981). Justice Powell recognized this argument in Central
Hudson: "There may be a greater incentive for a utility to advertise if it can use promotional
expenses in determining its rate of return, rather than pass those costs on solely to shareholders."
447 U.S. at 557, 568 n.1l.
233. See Pierson, Sales-RelatedandlnstitutionalAdvertising: The Case ofRate.RegulatedPub-
lic Utilities, in THE POLMCAL ECONOMY OF ADVERTISING 187, 207 (D. Tuerck ed. 1978). This
concept is echoed in Justice Blackmun's dissent in ConsolldatedEdison: "Due to the greater likeli-
hood that a recipient would read an insert with the bill, the utility well might desire to place its
insert with the bill even if the total cost of the mailing were charged to the shareholders." 447 U.S.
at 554 n.4 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also Note, supra note 96, at
604 n.9.
234. Interfuel competition for purposes of this Note is defined as competition between utilities
selling a different fuel product in the same market area. See West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935). In West Ohio Gas, Justice Cardozo stated:
The suggestion is made that there is no evidence of competition. We take judicial notice
of the fact that gas is in competition with otherforra offuel, such as oil and electricity. A
business never stands still. It either grows or decays. Within the limits of reason, adver-
tising or development expenses to foster normal growth are legitimate charges upon in-
come for rate purposes as for others.
Id. (emphasis added).
Those utilities that provide both gas and electric service are grouped with the all-electric utilities
for the purposes of this Note. Studies show that combined gas-electric utilities advertise less than
utilities that must engage in interfuel competition. See Wilder, Public UtilityAdvertlslng: Some
Observations, 49 LAND. ECON. 458-62 (1973).
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locate institutional advertising to the rate schedule. 5 This policy re-
flected the economic belief, widely espoused prior to the 1970s, that
utilities should maximize their resources to benefit from great econo-
mies of scale. 36 As economic and philosophical conditions changed,
237
regulatory commissions began the current trend of disallowing institu-
tional advertising cost allocation. This change is due partly to the be-
lief that the benefits from this advertising inure only to shareholders.238
Moreover, some courts consider institutional advertising a questionable
endeavor altogether.239
Institutional advertising is designed to enhance the utility's public
image.240 If the advertisement projects a misleading or false image of
the electric utility, cost allocation will be denied under the Central Hud-
son test, which denies first amendment protection for speech "mislead-
ing or relating to the unlawful."2 41 As with a direct prohibition on
institutional advertising,242 Central Hudson probably would prevent a
235. See, e.g., Re Alabama Power Co., 97 Pun. Urij- REP. (PUR) 3d 371 (Ala. P.S.C. 1972);
Re Central Me. Power Co., 8 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 277 (Me. P.U.C. 1975); Re Union Elec.
Co., 29 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 3d 254 (Mo. P.S.C. 1959); State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536
P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975); Re Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 9 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 204 (Wis.
P.S.C. 1975).
236. See notes 23-27 & 91-98 supra and accompanying text.
237. See notes"99-102 supra and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Re Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 PuB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 4th 153 (Ark.
P.S.C. 1976); Re Public Serv. Co., 13 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 40 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975); Re
Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 49 (111. Commerce Comm'n 1980); Re
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 10 Pus. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 13 (Md. P.S.C. 1975); Re Interstate
Power Co., 32 PuB. UTiL. Rm. (PUR) 4th 494 (Minn. P.S.C. 1979); Re Minn. Gas Co., 32 PuB.
UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 1 (S.D.P.S.C. 1979); Re Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 34 Pun. UTIL. REP.
(PUR) 4th 569 (Wis. P.S.C. 1980).
239. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in discussing what it designated "in-
formation" advertising (but what in effect was institutional advertising) stated:
A4ssuming for present purposes that a corporate body or person has the full and com-
plete protection of the constitutional right to freedom of speech unrelated to the immedi-
ate cultivation of profit and income in the matter of public service, or freedom of
educating the public, as propaganda is often entitled, the present record discloses no
interference with that right .... lift is certain that the consumers are not concerned with
such niceties as the image of a utility.
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 64 A.D.2d 345, 351, 410 N.Y.S.2d 142, 146
(1978) (emphasis added), af'd, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 413 N.E.2d 359, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981). See Re Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR)
4th 49 (11. Commerce Comm'n 1980); Re Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 34 PuB. UT. REP. (PUR)
4th 589 (Wis. P.S.C. 1980).
240. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
241. See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
242. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
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commission from disallowing the allocation of all or part of such an
advertising cost. Under part two of the test, the asserted substantial
state interest is having the consumers pay for only that which benefits
them.243 The court must balance this interest against the electric util-
ity's argument that image building advertising facilitates the attraction
of new capital needed to sustain service levels and meet expansion
needs.244 This argument, however, was unsuccessful in at least two
states and is not likely to prevail over the state's "benefit to the con-
sumer" interest."4s Moreover, the speculative nature of public relations
programs makes the specific amount of consumer benefit from institu-
tional advertising difficult to measure accurately. Faced with this un-
certainty, some courts may be inclined to disallow completely
allocation of these costs. Those courts should be mindful, however, of
the least restrictive means requirement of Central Hudson.246 To com-
ply with this requirement, a court must fashion a partial allocation of
the electric utility advertising expenses to the extent that consumers re-
ceive a benefit.24
Cost allocation of electric utility promotional advertising, also once
allowed and even encouraged,24" is now regularly denied. Regulatory
commissions justify this current trend by citing energy,249 environmen-
243. See cases cited note 238 s'upra.
244. See Re Alabama Power Co., 97 PuB. UnL. REP. (PUR) 3d 371 (Ala. P.S.C. 1972); Re
Consolidated Edison Co., 73 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 3d 417 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1968); Re Consolidated
Edison Co., 41 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 3d 305 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1961). In the 1961 ConsolldatedEdison
ruling, institutional advertisement was credited with producing benefit to both consumers and
shareholders: "To the extent that such advertising fosters sound consumer relations or encourages
people to invest in the company, it seems clear that the consumers, as well as the stockholders, are
ultimately benefitted through the lessening of the expense of doing business." Consolidated
Edison Co., 41 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 3d 305, 364 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1961).
At least one commentator suggested that public relations advertising may foster goodwill be-
tween customer and utility, thus resulting in an "economizing" of utility services. See Duffy,
supra note 5, at 9.
245. See Re General Tel. Co., 19 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 227 (Fla. P.S.C. 1977); Com-
husker State TeL Co., 13 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 314 (Neb. P.S.C. 1976). Although both,
decisions involve telephone utilities, they are useful by analogy to gas and electric utility decisions.
246. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
247. See note 216-17 supra and accompanying text.
248. See, ag., West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); City of El
Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 812,362 S.W.2d 680 (1962); Central Me. Power
Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 136 A.2d 726 (1957); State ex rel. Dyer v. Mis-
souri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1960).
The incidence of increased consumption was solicited in order to benefit from the economies of
scale, thereby reducing costs. See State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975).
249. See, ag., Re Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 268 (Fla.
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tal,250 and economic concerns.25 Under a Central Hudson analysis,
these interests must be weighed against the electric utility's arguments
that promotional advertising costs should be passed on to the
consumer.
252
Electric utility management justifies promotional advertising cost al-
location by arguing that a refusal to allocate costs will result in a reduc-
tion of shareholder profits.253 This result acts as a disincentive to
advertise.2 54 Accordingly, utilities assert that they are hesitant to en-
gage in promotional advertising for fear of undesirable financial ramifi-
cations. Another management justification is that promotion of electric
heating may convince users of home heating oil to switch to electricity,
thereby encouraging conservation of scarce petroleum resources.
255
b. Gas Utilities: The Impact of Interfuel Competition on Institu-
tional and Promotional Advertising Cost Allocation
The Central Hudson limitation on cost allocation of electric utility
advertising does not apply automatically to a gas utility's attempt to
allocate promotional advertising costs. Gas utilities often engage in in-
terfuel competition with electric utilities.2 56 In those markets, gas utili-
P.S.C. 1975); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); Re Michigan Power
Co., 18 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 418 (Mich. P.S.C. 1977); cases cited in notes 107 & 208 supra.
250. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 3d 270 (Cal. P.U.C. 1971); Re
Pablic Serv. Co., 13 PUB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 40 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co.,
56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); cases cited in notes 108 & 209 supra.
251. Re Gas Co., 35 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 106 (N.M.P.S.C. 1980); Re Minnesota Gas
Co., 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 1 (S.D.P.S.C. 1979); cases cited in notes 109 & 210 supra.
252. See note 199 su.pra and accompanying text.
253. See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
254. See note 202 supra and accompanying text.
255. See Heller, Restrictions on Electric UtilityAdertising Must Gol, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec.
19, 1980, at 29, 30.
Approximately 21.3% of the homes in the United States used fuel oil or kerosene as a primary
source of heat. See THE ENERGY FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at 36. Consumers have shown a
propensity to switch from gas and oil to electricity. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK, supra note
4, at 96. In 1977, 50.6% of all new homes completed in that year were heated by electricity. See
THE ENERGY FACTBOO, supra note 4, at 38.
If the Central Hudson substantial state interest test is now the proper standard by which to
evaluate gas and electric utility advertising, promotional advertising designed to convince users of
home heating oil to switch to electricity would serve energy conservation, a recognized substantial
state interest. In this context, cost allocation could not be denied under the substantial state inter-
est part of Central Hudson.
256. Electricity tends to displace the use of gas and oil as the primary heating system in the
residential sector. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 96. This trend is most evi-
dent in the newly completed home market. In 1976 and 1977 approximately 50% of all newly
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ties are placed at a distinct disadvantage because virtually every home
in any given competitive market area will need electricity for lighting
and most appliances.257 Gas, by contrast, is used only for some appli-
ances and home heating and is less indigenous to domestic use. 258 This
inherent disadvantage compels gas utilities, in order to remain compet-
itive, to solicit customers by advertising more zealously than electric
utilities. 59 This added measure of advertising is merely an integral
part of a gas utility's ordinary operating expenses. 260 Accordingly, pro-
motional advertising cost allocation is recognized in many jurisdictions
as essential to gas utility viability.261
Courts must take notice of the unequal position of gas and electric
utilities. Under Central Hudson a court must weigh the asserted state
interest against the utility's interest in promotional advertising cost al-
constructed homes were heated by electricity. See THE ENERGY FACTBOOK, stpra note 4, at 38.
During this same period, the percentage of newly completed homes heating with gas consistently
declined to below 39%. See id
257. In 1979, 99.8% of all homes in the United States were wired for electrical appliances. See
THE ENERGY FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at 47. Electricity is used to power most household appli-
ances, including air conditioners, dishwashers, clothes dryers, ranges, freezers, refrigerators, tele-
visions, washers, and lighting. See id
258. Only 55% of all housing units utilized gas for heating in 1977. See id at 36. The uses of
gas to operate appliances is less extensive and more specialized. In addition to home space and
water heating, gas is used for air conditioning, gas grills, gas lights, and clothes dryers. See Id at
462.
259. Promotional advertising enables a gas utility to compete with an interfuel competitor.
The degree of competition determines and justifies the reasonableness of advertising costs. See
Duffy, supra note 5, at 9.
The gas utility industry is recognized by the Missouri Public Service Commission as a "high
risk" business in which a utility "may lose (because of the gas supply shortage generally endemic
in the industry) customer after customer to alternate fuels and eventually lose all its customers."
Brief for Appellant at 50-51, Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (citing findings of Missouri Public Service Commission), appeal drmissed, 449 U.S.
1072 (1981). For data on projected supplies of natural gas, see note 263 infra.
260. Re Advertising Practices of TeL, Elec., & Gas Distribution Cos., 35 PuB. UTIL. REp.
(PUR) 4th 361 (NJ. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1980); Re National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., No. 80-10
(N.Y.P.S.C. Mar. 13, 1980).
261. See, e.g., West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utis. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); Re Arkan-
sas La. Gas Co., 40 PuB. UL. REP. (PUR) 3d 209 (Ark. P.S.C. 1961); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87
PUB. UTi. RaP. (PUR) 3d 270 (Cal. P.U.C. 1971); Re Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 PuB. UTIL. REP.
(PUR) 3d 300 (Cal. P.U.C. 1960); Re San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 26 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 3d
129 (Cal. P.U.C. 1958); Re Union Elec. Co., 81 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 3d 85 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n 1969); State exrel. Util. Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536, 119 S.E.2d
469 (1961); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 22 PuB. UTn. REP. (PUR) 3d 505 (N.D.P.U.C. 1958);
City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 92 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) (New Series) 133
(Wis. P.S.C. 1952).
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location.262 A gas utility's unique need for promotional advertising
should outweigh any asserted state conservation interest.263
Moreover, gas utility promotional advertising serves substantial state
environmental and economic interests. Natural gas is the cleanest
burning of the fossil fuel energy group. 264 By promoting the use of gas,
a utility furthers the state's interest in environmental protection. The
promotion of gas consumption also supports a state concern for pru-
dent economic policy. First, the principle of economies of scale is still
largely operative in the gas utility industry.2 65 Additionally, promo-
tional advertising by gas utilities encourages the most economic use of
available resources. Heating with electricity instead of gas is more ex-
pensive and less efficient.266 Relative to electricity, consumption of gas
262. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
263. From 1969 to 1975, gas was in a relative state of short supply. See R. PIERCE, G. AL-
LISON & P. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 448. When supply is low, a state can rightfully assert a
substantial interest in preventing promotion of consumption of a scarce fuel. Conversely, if sup-
ply is sufficient to meet expanded need, promotional advertising cost allocation should be allowed
because the increased consumption would further the benefits of economies of scale. See, e.g., Re
Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 27 PuB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 452 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1978). Recent studies
and projections indicate that natural gas supplies will be abundant for the foreseeable future. See
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 10, 1981, at 46; id, at 13; id, June 15, 1981, at 37; id, Feb. 12, 1981, at41.
264. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 283; R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON & P.
MARTIN, supra note 4, at 457. The fossil fuel energy group includes the following primary fuel
sources: coal, natural gas, and petroleum. See THE ENERGY FACT BOOK, supra note 4, at 10.
These three fuels provide the bulk of total energy consumed by the end-use sector. For example,
in 1979, 78.787 quadrillion Btu of energy were consumed in the United States. Of that amount,
coal, natural gas, and petroleum represented 72.721 quadrillion Btu.
265. See I A. KAHN, supra note 26, at 125; Brief for Appellants at 19, 66-67, Laclede Gas Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1072
(1981). The appellants in Laclede noted:
As to the evidence, both the staff [Missouri Public Service Commission] witness and the
Company [Laclede] witness agreed that advertising promoting the use of gas is beneficial
to Laclede and to its customers .... Laclede's ability to hold down the cost of gas
service to its customers is due in large part to the Company's sustained growth, which
growth has and will require advertising support. Increases in sales on Laclede's system
produce a greater overall utilization of the system and a spreading of the costs of both
the physical facilities and managerial overheads, thus lowering overall unit costs to all
customers' benefit.
Id.
266. See Brief for Appellants at 19, Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981) (quoting Missouri Public Service
Commission Staff witness). Another valid justification for the promotion of gas consumption is
that gas is readily storable for future use. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 21, at 120. Since 1975, total
gas in storage has ranged from 4,497 billion cubic feet to 6,563 billion cubic feet. See THE EN-
ERGY FACT BooK, supra note 4, at 478. Gas is generally stored in depleted underground geologic
formations. See R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 456. In contrast to gas,
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promotes the substantial state interest of economic efficiency. Hence,
contrary to recent commission rulings,2 67 a gas utility's inherent market
disadvantage, its benefit to the environment, and consumer economic
interests should justify cost allocation of gas promotional
advertising.268
Similarly, contrary to recent regulatory commission rulings, 269 insti-
tutional advertising by gas utilities also deserves cost allocation. Un-
like electric utilities, the lustre of the gas utility industry is tarnished by
a safety stigma.27 0 Institutional advertising is a necessary expense for
gas utilities to assure actual and potential customers of the safety and
reliability of their product.271 This expense is an incidence of doing
business in a market in which the electricity utility competition does
not face a safety stigma. Under Central Hudson the gas utility's spe-
electricity is virtually impossible to store economically. See THE ENERGY SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 4, at 32; R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 739.
267. See .Re Atlanta Gas Light Co., No. 3167-U (Ga. P.S.C. Jan. 10, 1980); Re Common-
wealth Edison Co., 35 PUB. UT,. REP. (PUR) 4th 49 (111. Commerce Comm'n 1980); Re Determi-
nation of Whether Advertising Rules Conform to Pub. Util. Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, No.
35723 (Ind. P.S.C. Jan. 16, 1980); Re Michigan Gas Utils. Co., No. U-6022 (Mich. P.S.C. Feb. 5,
1980); Re Gas Co., 35 PuB. UTiL. REP. (PUR) 4th 106 (N.M.P.S.C. 1980); Re Minnesota Gas Co.,
32 PUB. UTm. REP. (PUR) 4th 1 (S.D.P.U.C. 1979).
268. See notes 263-66 supra and accompanying text. Those regulations affecting commercial
speech related to fundamental interests have met with court disapproval. See Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); note 49 supra. Gas utilities have a fundamental right to operate
and receive a "fair return" on their investment. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); notes
54-64 supra. Accordingly, regulations that put gas utilities at a distinct disadvantage with respect
to interfuel competitors should not be upheld.
269. See, ag., Re Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 PUn. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 49 (Ill. Com-
merce Comm'n 1980); Re Interstate Power Co., 32 PuB. UTIL REP. (PUR) 4th 494 (Minn. P.S.C.
1979); Re Minnesota Gas Co., 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 1 (S.D.P.U.C. 1979); Re Madison
Gas & Elec. Co., 34 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 4th 569 (Wis. P.S.C. 1980).
270. See Re National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 17 PuB. UnL. REP. (PUR) 4th 138, 146-47
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1976) (institutional advertising will be needed to help, among other things, to remove
the safety stigma).
This point is poignantly illustrated by the disasters that occurred in Centralia, Missouri, on
January 29, 1981 and Zanesville, Ohio, on August 9, 1969. In both instances, a ruptured gas
pressure regulator sent high pressure gas of 40 pounds per square inch into low pressure lines
designed for four ounces per square inch. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Jan. 29, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
As a result, the sudden surge of gas turned pilot lights into "blow torches." Id. at col. 3. In the
Centralia fire, nine homes were destroyed and 19 others were damaged. Id. at col. 6. Property
damage was estimated at $250,000 to $500,000. Id. at col 2. The Zanesville fire caused $67,000
damage. Id. at col 6.
271. Institutional advertising to remove a safety stigma should be distinguished from informa-
tional advertising purveying safety tips. The former is needed and intended to convince potential
customers of the positive qualities of gas use in the home.
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cialized need for institutional advertising cost allocation should out-
weigh any asserted state conservationist, environmental, or economic
interest, including benefit to the consumer. Hence, in those situations
in which a commission wholly or partially denies institutional advertis-
ing cost allocation to electric utilities, it should allow the cost allocation
for gas utilities.272
IV. THE INTERFACE OF CENTRAL HUDSON AND WEST OHIO GAS
Justice Powell recognized energy conservation as a substantial state
interest in Central Hudson.27 3 In making this observation, the Court
followed the current regulatory trend of evaluating the content of the
advertisement rather than focusing on the reasonableness of the
amount of the expenditure. By endorsing a test based on advertising
content, the Court adopted, perhaps unwittingly, a new meaning of
"reasonableness."274 The Court, without comment, bypassed constitu-
tional precedent" 5 and established an analysis not based on the West
Ohio Gas reasonableness of amount approach.
The Central Hudson test raises serious questions and engenders con-
stitutional confusion as to the continued validity of the West Ohio Gas
reasonableness standard. If the current trend of content regulation is
proper, environmental and economic concerns, as well as energy con-
servation, will qualify as substantial state interests and lead to disallow-
ance of advertising cost allocation, regardless of the reasonableness of
the cost's actual amount. Without the benefit of cost allocation, adver-
tising by utilities will portend undesired financial consequences.276 Un-
willing to incur economic imprudence voluntarily, utilities may forego
advertising altogether. The effect of the Central Hudson approach may
272. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of cost allocation for goodwill advertising
and, in fact, has deliberately skirted it. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530 (1980); Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comim'n, 600 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980),
appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1072 (1981). The dismissal of the appeal in Laclede Gas, however,
should not be viewed as an attempt by the Supreme Court to preclude cost allocation of institu-
tional advertising. The specific wording of the dismissal leaves open the possibility for review of
this issue at a later time. In fact, a closer inspection of the Laclede Gas appeal reveals that the
cursory and conclusory opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals gave the Supreme Court little
room to explore the parameters of this issue. Hence, the dismissal of the appeal does not preclude
the possibility of eventual Supreme Court review of this issue.
273. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980).
274. See notes 102-09 supra and accompanying text.
275. See notes 91-101 supra and accompanying text.
276. See notes 199-202 supra and accompanying text.
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promote a "chilling" of commercial speech. In light of these implica-
tions, the Supreme court should undertake a thorough reevaluation of
West Ohio Gas to determine whether the results of the current regula-
tory trend are desirable.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to past practice and policy,277 state regulatory commissions
now restrict electric and gas utility advertising either by direct prohibi-
tion2 78 or denial of cost allocation.279 Commissions justify these
restrictions on content-based conservationist,280 environmental, 281 and
economic policies.282 Thus, regulatory commissions, aided by state and
federal legislative and judicial support,283 have given the traditional
West Ohio Gas reasonableness standard2' a new meaning. The rea-
sonableness of utility advertising now depends on its content instead of
the amount of its cost.2 85
In response to these restrictions on advertising, gas and electric utili-
ties recently have raised a first amendment defense under the commer-
cial speech doctrine.286 As a result, utilities have brought into conflict
substantial national concerns: the sacrosanct notion of free speech and
the nation's interests in energy conservation, environmental protection,
and inflation control. The resolution of this conflict depends upon the
four-part commercial speech analysis established in Central Hudson .287
Under this analysis, a public service commission's direct prohibition of
a gas or electric utility's informational, political, institutional, or pro-
motional advertising will violate the first amendment commercial
speech doctrine.288
The resolution under Central Hudson of the more difficult issue of
cost allocation depends on the type of advertising and the nature of the
277. See notes 1 & 94-99 supra and accompanying text.
278. See notes 8, 158 & 163-95 supra and accompanying text.
279. See notes 9, 159 & 196-271 supra and accompanying text.
280. See notes 5, 107 & 208 supra and accompanying text.
281. See notes 6, 108 & 209 supra and accompanying text.
282. See notes 7, 109 & 210 supra and accompanying text.
283. See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text.
284. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
285. See notes 102-09 supra and accompanying text.
286. See notes 11, 115 & 157 supra and accompanying text.
287. See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying text.




utility speaker. Commissions will not likely permit an electric utility to
allocate institutional and promotional advertising.289 Regulatory com-
missions, however, should allocate both gas and electric utility infor-
mational advertising costs to consumer rates.290 Political advertising
cost allocation by either gas or electric utilities, though likely to be de-
nied,291 may receive protection under the traditional first amendment
standard. 92 Finally, gas utilities, because of inherent interfuel inequi-
ties,2 93 should receive special consideration as to institutional and pro-
motional advertising cost allocation.294
The advent of content-based advertising restrictions and the adop-
tion, by the Supreme Court of a content-based policy raises serious
questions as to the role and continued validity of the West Ohio Gas
reasonableness standard. Should the Court reevaluate West Ohio Gas
and determine that content-based restrictions on advertising are valid,
gas and electric utilities will be stripped of any due process or manage-
ment prerogative defenses.2 95 These utilities would be left with only
the commercial speech doctrine with which to justify advertising and
cost allocation. Accordingly, courts and regulatory commissions
should consider the inherent inequities of interfuel competition and
strive to perform the concededly difficult task of partial allocation to
encourage continued use of that advertising which is economically and
socially warranted.296
A Steven Jones
289. See notes 241-45, 252-53 & 274-76 supra and accompanying text.
290. See notes 205-15 supra and accompanying text.
291. See notes 219-23 & 231-33 supra and accompanying text.
292. See notes 169-85 & 219-23 supra and accompanying text.
293. See notes 256-60 supra and accompanying text.
294. See notes 173-78 supra and accompanying text.
295. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
296. See notes 216-17, 230 & 247 supra and accompanying text.
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